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REGULATING ENTITIES AND 
ACTIVITIES: COMPLEMENTARY 
APPROACHES TO NONBANK  
SYSTEMIC RISK 
JEREMY C. KRESS,* PATRICIA A. MCCOY† & DANIEL SCHWARCZ‡ 
The recent financial crisis demonstrated that, contrary to longstanding 
regulatory assumptions, nonbank financial firms—such as investment banks 
and insurance companies—can propagate systemic risk throughout the 
financial system. After the crisis, policymakers in the United States and 
abroad developed two different strategies for dealing with nonbank systemic 
risk. The first strategy seeks to regulate individual nonbank entities that 
officials designate as being potentially systemically important. The second 
approach targets financial activities that could create systemic risk, 
irrespective of the types of firms that engage in those transactions. In the last 
several years, domestic and international policymakers have come to view 
these two strategies as substitutes, largely abandoning entity-based 
designations in favor of activities-based approaches. This Article argues that 
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this trend is deeply misguided because entity- and activities-based 
approaches are complementary tools that are each essential for effectively 
regulating nonbank systemic risk. Eliminating an entity-based approach to 
nonbank systemic risk—either formally or through onerous procedural 
requirements—would expose the financial system to the same risks that it 
experienced in 2008 as a result of distress at nonbanks like AIG, Bear 
Stearns, and Lehman Brothers. This conclusion is especially salient in the 
United States, where jurisdictional fragmentation undermines the capacity 
of financial regulators to implement an effective activities-based approach. 
Significant reforms to the U.S. regulatory framework are necessary, 
therefore, before an activities-based approach can meaningfully 
complement domestic entity-based systemic risk regulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, a consensus has emerged among policymakers and 
academics that systemic risk is not confined to the traditional banking 
sector.1 Instead, contrary to longstanding assumptions, various types of 
nonbank financial firms—such as investment banks and insurance 
companies—can generate instability that propagates throughout the financial 
system, with potentially dire consequences.2 The global financial crisis of 
2008 was a vivid demonstration of such nonbank systemic risk.3 
After the crisis abated, Congress resolved to strengthen regulation of 
nonbank financial firms. To accomplish this, it created the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (“FSOC”) as a centerpiece of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).4 Comprised of top 
financial regulators, FSOC is responsible for diagnosing and responding to 
emerging forms of systemic risk whether or not those risks are confined to 
the banking system.5 
Congress mapped out two strategies for FSOC to achieve this objective. 
The first, dubbed an entity-based approach, empowers FSOC to designate as 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (“SIFIs”) individual, nonbank 
financial firms that could pose systemic risk but are not appropriately 
regulated with respect to this danger.6 Designated SIFIs are subject to a 
supplemental layer of restrictions and oversight that augment their baseline 
regulatory regime.7 This enhanced regulation of nonbank SIFIs is conducted 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 445–48 (2016); 
MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 59–62 (2d ed. 2018); KATHLEEN 
C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, 
AND NEXT STEPS 25–27, 69–75 (2011); Hilary J. Allen, The SEC as Financial Stability Regulator, 43 J. 
CORP. L. 715, 718–22 (2018); Daniel Schwarcz & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk in 
Insurance, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1569, 1601 (2014). 
 2. See infra Part I.  
 3. See U.S. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 27–34, 255 
(2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [hereinafter FCIC 
REPORT]. 
 4. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, § 111, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392−94 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2018)). 
 5. Hilary J. Allen, Putting the “Financial Stability” in Financial Stability Oversight Council, 76 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1087, 1113 (2015); Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Dynamic Precaution” in Maintaining Financial 
Stability: The Importance of FSOC, in TEN YEARS AFTER THE CRASH (Sharyn O’Halloran & Thomas 
Groll, eds., forthcoming 2019); Patricia A. McCoy, Systemic Risk Oversight and the Shifting Balance of 
State and Federal Authority Over Insurance, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1389, 1411–12 (2015); Christina 
Parajon Skinner, Regulating Nonbanks: A Plan for SIFI Lite, 105 GEO. L.J. 1379, 1382 (2017). 
 6. Daniel Schwarcz & David Zaring, Regulation by Threat: Dodd-Frank and the Nonbank 
Problem, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1813, 1835–38 (2017). 
 7. See id. 
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by the Federal Reserve—traditionally a bank regulator—and focuses on 
limiting the risk that designated firms could threaten financial stability.8 
Although unique in some respects, FSOC’s entity-based authority 
builds on a long history of entity-based financial regulation. Indeed, many 
traditional forms of financial regulation—such as solvency regulation of 
insurers and banks—focus on oversight of individual legal entities. 
Oftentimes, a legal entity’s charter type dictates its applicable regulatory 
regime, with investment banks subject to one set of regulatory restrictions, 
insurers a second set, and commercial banks a third.9 FSOC’s entity-based 
approach departs from this tradition because its enhanced regulations apply 
to all nonbank SIFIs, regardless of their charter types. But aside from this 
design feature, FSOC’s entity-based approach fits comfortably within 
traditional entity-based schemes of financial regulation.10 
The second strategy that FSOC can employ to address nonbank 
systemic risk is to target systemically risky financial activities, irrespective 
of the firms that engage in those activities. Although this has come to be 
known as FSOC’s activities-based authority, Dodd-Frank did not actually 
give FSOC power to regulate financial activities directly.11 Instead, it merely 
empowered FSOC to make nonbinding recommendations that individual 
federal agencies implement activities-based reforms under their preexisting 
authorities.12 
As with its entity-based approach, FSOC’s activities-based authority is 
hardly unique from the standpoint of regulatory architecture. In fact, many 
types of financial regulations are organized around activities, rather than 
firms. Perhaps the most well-known reform in Dodd-Frank—the creation of 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)—is, in many ways, 
focused on the activities of consumer credit and payment systems, rather than 
the firms engaging in those activities.13 The same can be said of Dodd-
 
 
 8. See id. 
 9. Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory 
Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 333–34 (1999); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Risk Not Function, 
66 U. CIN. L. REV. 441, 442–43 (1998). 
 10. See infra Part II. The fact that the Federal Reserve’s regulatory scheme is specifically designed 
to supplement, rather than displace, the ordinary entity-based rules that apply to designated firms is also 
unusual. But overlapping entity-based regulatory schemes are not unique, particularly when a firm is 
chartered as one type of financial institution but engages in activities that fall within the definition of 
another type of financial institution. 
 11. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 112(a)(2)(K), 124 Stat. 1376, 1395 (2010) (codified 
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2)(K) (2018)). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 98 (2008) 
(proposing the creation of a Financial Product Safety Commission). 
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Frank’s derivatives reforms, which generally target the activity of 
derivatives trading, not the entities that conduct this trading.14 Thus, while 
the procedures associated with FSOC’s activities-based authority—
particularly its nonbinding status—are unusual, the idea of organizing 
financial regulation around activities, rather than firms, is not. 
During the first several years after its creation in Dodd-Frank, FSOC 
deployed its entity- and activities-based authorities to varying extents. FSOC 
first focused on developing its entity-based authority, promulgating a 
lengthy rule laying out its procedural and substantive framework for 
evaluating whether a nonbank firm poses a systemic risk.15 It subsequently 
designated four firms—American International Group (“AIG”), Prudential 
Financial, General Electric Capital Corporation, and MetLife, Inc.—as 
nonbank SIFIs.16 FSOC also used its activities-based authority during this 
timeframe, albeit only once. In 2012, it recommended that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopt one of three potential reforms to its 
regulatory scheme for money market mutual funds (“MMMF”).17 The SEC 
responded by implementing its own version of MMMF reforms the 
following year.18 
More recently, however, an emerging view has begun to dominate 
financial regulatory circles: that FSOC should focus principally on its 
activities-based, rather than its entity-based, authority.19 This view, which 
originated within think tanks and the financial industry,20 gained momentum 
after President Donald Trump’s election and became the official policy of 
the U.S. Treasury Department in an important 2017 Treasury Report.21 
 
 
 14. See Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. 
L.J. 387, 436–37 (2013).  
 15. Financial Stability Oversight Council Guidance for Nonbank Financial Company 
Determinations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310, app. A (2019) [hereinafter FSOC Guidance]. 
 16. See Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 6, at 1841. 
 17. See Proposed Recommendations Regarding Money Market Mutual Fund Reform, 77 Fed. Reg. 
69,455, 69,455−57 (Nov. 19, 2012). 
 18. See SEC Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF, Securities Act Release No. 
9616, Investment Company Act Release No. 31166, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,736, 47,737−39 (Aug. 14, 2014). 
The SEC’s MMMF rules, however, were less aggressive than the approaches FSOC had proposed. See 
infra note 258. 
 19. See infra Section II.A. 
 20. See, e.g., Complaint at 43–46, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 
3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 15-45); Scott E. Harrington, Systemic Risk and Regulation: The Misguided 
Case of Insurance SIFIs (Oct. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2998646); Peter J. Wallison, Opinion, The Trump Treasury’s Disturbing Regulatory Turn, WALL ST. J. 
(Dec. 6, 2017, 6:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-trump-treasurys-disturbing-regulatory-turn-
1512601948. 
 21. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL 
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FSOC’s entity-based approach has now fallen out of favor, and the Council 
has reversed the designations of all four nonbank SIFIs.22 In a bid to make 
this trend lasting, the Treasury Report proposed a series of onerous 
procedural barriers to future nonbank SIFI designations.23 These include a 
requirement that individual designations pass traditional cost-benefit 
analysis and that FSOC conduct various quantitative assessments when 
considering whether a firm’s distress could threaten U.S. financial stability.24 
Consistent with the Treasury Department’s recommendations, FSOC 
proposed in early 2019 to prioritize an activities-based approach to nonbank 
systemic risk and codify these barriers to new nonbank SIFI designations.25 
This move away from an entity-based approach to nonbank systemic 
risk is not localized to the United States. To the contrary, the Financial 
Stability Board (“FSB”) announced that it will no longer update its list of 
international insurance SIFIs—known as Global Systemically Important 
Insurers (“G-SIIs”)—which it has been publishing since 2013 in a parallel 
process to FSOC’s entity-based approach.26 The FSB explained that 
ongoing work “to develop an Activities-Based Approach to systemic risk in 
the insurance sector . . . may have significant implications for . . . the 
identification of G-SIIs and for G-SII policy measures.”27 In sum, entity-
based approaches to nonbank systemic risk have already been largely 
displaced, and this displacement may well prove permanent if current trends 
continue.28 
This Article challenges the emerging consensus that FSOC and its 
international counterparts should rely predominantly or exclusively on an 
activities-based, rather than an entity-based, approach to nonbank systemic 
 
 
DESIGNATIONS 21 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/news/Pages/Treasury-Releases-Memo 
randum-to-the-President-on-FSOCs-Designation.aspx [hereinafter TREASURY FSOC REPORT]. 
 22. See infra Section II.A. 
 23. See TREASURY FSOC REPORT, supra note 21, at 22–29. 
 24. See infra Section II.B. 
 25. Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 
84 Fed. Reg. 9028, 9028−29 (proposed March 13, 2019) [hereinafter FSOC Proposal]. 
 26. FIN. STABILITY BD., ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES FOR IDENTIFYING NON-BANK NON-
INSURER GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 6–9 (2015), http://www. 
fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2nd-Con-Doc-on-NBNI-G-SIFI-methodologies.pdf; Press Release, Fin. 
Stability Bd., FSB Statement on Identification of Global Systemically Important Insurers (Nov. 21, 2017), 
http://www.fsb.org/2017/11/fsb-statement-on-identification-of-global-systemically-important-insurers 
[hereinafter FSB Press Release].  
 27. FSB Press Release, supra note 26. 
 28. For an international perspective on the evolution of nonbank systemic risk regulation, see 
generally Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy & Daniel Schwarcz, Activities Are Not Enough!: Why 
Non-bank SIFI Designations Are Essential to Prevent Systemic Risk, in SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE FINANCIAL 
SECTOR: TEN YEARS AFTER THE GREAT CRASH 165 (Douglas W. Arner et al. eds., 2019). 
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risk. Instead, it argues that entity- and activities-based approaches are both 
essential, and complementary, components of an integrated strategy to 
effectively regulate new and emerging forms of nonbank systemic risk. 
Eliminating or substantially impeding the designation of nonbank SIFIs, the 
Article contends, will ultimately expose the financial system to the same 
risks that the world experienced in 2008 as a result of the financial distress 
of nonbanks like AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers.29 
In advancing this argument, the Article first contends that even a well-
implemented activities-based regime cannot, on its own, prevent individual 
nonbank firms from transmitting systemic risk.30 At bottom, this is because 
an individual firm’s systemic riskiness is inherently a product of the 
interrelations among its various activities and risk-management practices. 
Individual activities may pose limited systemic risk in isolation, but much 
greater systemic risk when combined with one another at a single firm with 
lax risk-management practices and aggressive investment strategies. 
This reality is illustrated by each of the major nonbanks that threatened 
catastrophic failure in 2008, all of which were pushed to the brink by a broad 
range of activities, rather than a single activity in isolation. AIG, for instance, 
nearly failed because of the toxic interactions between its derivatives and 
securities lending operations.31 Meanwhile, investment banks like Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers failed because they relied on numerous 
different types of short-term borrowing—including commercial paper, 
repurchase agreements (“repos”), and warehouse lines of credit—to back 
their investments in illiquid mortgage-backed securities.32 
An activities-based approach is inherently blind to this cumulative 
nature of a firm’s systemic risk profile. To be sure, an activities-based 
approach might be able to prevent systemic insolvencies if only a few, well-
defined activities were essential ingredients for a firm to pose this type of 
risk. But that is not the case. To the contrary, even assuming that a firm can 
only be systemically important if it is subject to the possibility of a bank-like 
“run”—an assumption we ultimately reject—the financial crisis illustrated 
that there are countless ways for financial activities to create this prospect. 
Not only can short-term borrowing come in innumerable forms, but various 
activities that are not borrowing at all—such as transactions that potentially 
require firms to post increasing amounts of cash collateral or activities that 
 
 
 29. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 280–91, 309–52. 
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. See Daniel Schwarcz, A Critical Take on Group Regulation of Insurers in the United States, 5 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 537, 553–54 (2015). 
 32. See ARMOUR ET AL., supra note 1, at 445–48. 
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allow investors to redeem equity investments on demand—can also generate 
runs on nonbank financial firms. Even more importantly, identifying ahead 
of time which new financial activities may create run risk is a nearly 
impossible assignment for regulators given the varied forms such risk can 
take and the constant evolution of activities to evade regulatory restrictions.33 
In contrast to an activities-based approach, an entity-based approach is 
reasonably well designed to limit the risk that a systemically important 
nonbank will fail. Perhaps most obviously, the content of entity-based 
regulation—such as capital, liquidity, and risk-management requirements—
is inherently focused on the cumulative impact of a firm’s activities across 
the entire financial conglomerate.34 Moreover, an entity-based approach is a 
more effective deterrent against firms taking on systemic risk than an 
activities-based approach, as firms can much more easily and quickly adjust 
to new activities-based rules through regulatory arbitrage.35 An entity-based 
approach is also inherently more reliable than the alternative, as identifying 
systemically significant firms is substantially easier than identifying 
systemically significant activities ex ante. Finally, an entity-based approach 
that includes resolution planning requirements is necessary for the success 
of Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”), which is designed 
to limit the consequences of systemic insolvencies when they do occur. 
Proposals to eliminate or deemphasize an entity-based approach in 
favor of an activities-based approach are misguided for a second set of 
reasons: an activities-based approach is much harder to implement 
effectively, particularly in fragmented regulatory systems like the United 
States’.36 This point is underscored by the obvious, but often overlooked or 
mischaracterized, fact that FSOC does not have any legal authority to 
implement activities-based reforms directly. Instead, it can only make 
nonbinding recommendations that other agencies adopt such rules. As such, 
proposals to deemphasize FSOC’s designation authority would end up 
turning it into a glorified think tank. 
Like FSOC, other domestic financial regulators have limited authority 
to implement activities-based reforms. In theory, an effective activities-
based regime would have a single regulator and would apply to all companies 
that engage in a particular activity, regardless of charter type. In practice, 
however, it is highly unusual for activities-based rules to apply uniformly to 
 
 
 33. See Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 
1635 (2011). 
 34. See infra Section III.B. 
 35. See Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 6, at 1813. 
 36. See infra Part IV. 
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all financial firms, particularly in the United States. This fragmentation often 
leads to coverage gaps and divergent outcomes, depending on the 
categorization of firms engaging in specific activities.37 These gaps and 
inconsistencies, in turn, promote regulatory arbitrage and undermine 
regulators’ capacity to grasp the full risks created by particular 
transactions.38 
By contrast, FSOC’s entity-based approach faces none of these 
implementation challenges. Most importantly, this is because it is layered on 
top of a firm’s default regulatory regime and only applies when FSOC 
determines that the baseline regime is insufficient to prevent systemic risk. 
Moreover, the Federal Reserve, which administers entity-based regulation of 
nonbank SIFIs, has a systemic perspective on risk due to its superior access 
to information about the global financial system. No other entity-based 
regulator, state or federal, has access to the same full set of information 
needed to address system-wide risks. 
None of this is to say that a well-designed activities-based approach 
cannot help preserve financial stability. To the contrary, if configured 
appropriately, activities-based regulation has the potential to combat some 
sources of nonbank systemic risk even more effectively than an entity-based 
approach.39 Most importantly, an activities-based approach is uniquely 
capable of responding to systemic risk that may arise from correlations 
across numerous different nonbank firms’ investment activities, risk-
management practices, or product features.40 An activities-based approach 
may also be better designed to address certain risks that arise from complex 
relationships among firms and that require regulators or other actors to 
mediate intercompany relationships though market infrastructure, such as 
clearinghouses and exchanges. Finally, an activities-based approach can help 
limit the type of regulatory arbitrage that accompanies all entity-based 
financial regulatory regimes. When properly configured, therefore, an 
activities-based approach can both level the regulatory playing field across 
different market segments and prevent risks from relocating to less regulated 
entities by applying consistent standards to financial transactions, regardless 
of a firm’s legal classification. 
As currently structured, however, the fragmented U.S. regulatory 
framework is not designed to realize these potential benefits of activities-
 
 
 37. See infra id. 
 38. See infra id. 
 39. See infra Section V.B. 
 40. See infra Section V.B.1; see also Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1601. 
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based regulation. To operationalize an effective activities-based approach, 
the United States would need to create a single financial stability regulator 
with authority to oversee activities spanning different segments of the 
financial sector. With such structural reforms, activities-based regulation 
could meaningfully complement an effective entity-based approach. In the 
absence of such reforms, however, proposals to rely primarily or exclusively 
on an activities-based approach to nonbank systemic risk are doomed to fail. 
The Article details these arguments in five Parts. Part I begins by briefly 
reviewing the role of nonbank firms in the financial crisis and the continued 
threats to financial stability posed by nonbank firms. In Part II, the Article 
traces the evolution of entity-based and activities-based approaches to 
nonbank systemic risk, showing the former has gradually been eclipsed by 
the latter. Part III explains why even a well-crafted activities-based approach 
must be supplemented with a robust entity-based approach to prevent 
nonbanks from posing the risk of systemic insolvencies. In fact, Part IV 
shows that activities-based regulation faces serious implementation 
challenges, particularly in fragmented financial regulatory systems like the 
United States regime. Part V then explores the significant reforms to the U.S. 
regulatory framework that would be necessary to operationalize an effective 
activities-based approach in the United States. Finally, Part V examines the 
unique benefits that an appropriately configured activities-based approach 
could offer as a complement to, rather than substitute for, entity-based 
regulation. The Article therefore concludes that properly designed entity- 
and activities-based approaches are essential and complementary elements 
of an effective scheme to regulate nonbank systemic risk. 
I.  THE NONBANK SIFI PROBLEM 
The financial crisis demonstrated unequivocally that nonbank financial 
companies can destabilize the financial system when not regulated 
appropriately. This Part examines how nonbanks transmit systemic risk. 
Section I.A begins by reviewing the central role that nonbanks played in 
triggering the crisis. Section I.B then assesses the continuing financial 
stability risks that nonbanks still pose a decade later. Finally, Section I.C 
highlights two principal ways in which nonbanks might transmit instability 
to the broader financial system: through the counterparty and asset 
liquidation channels. 
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A.  THE ROLE OF NONBANKS IN THE CRISIS 
Countless books, reports, and articles have explored the role of nonbank 
financial firms in the 2008 financial crisis.41 Not surprisingly, these sources 
disagree about myriad issues, ranging from the relative fault of different 
types of nonbanks in causing the crisis to the transmission mechanisms by 
which instability at nonbanks spread throughout the financial system. But 
virtually all commentators agree on one central point: contrary to long-
standing regulatory assumptions, the crisis conclusively demonstrated that 
nonbank financial firms can indeed threaten the stability of the financial 
system and the broader economy. 
There is little doubt, for instance, that nonbank financial firms were 
central in creating and propagating the mortgage-linked securities that sowed 
the seeds for the 2008 crisis. Nonbank mortgage companies like Ameriquest 
and New Century created the raw material for these instruments by issuing 
billions of dollars of subprime loans to borrowers who had no realistic ability 
to repay.42 These shaky loans were then repackaged into exotic mortgage-
linked securities issued by those lenders or by nonbank securities 
underwriters like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Goldman Sachs.43 To 
promote the sale of these toxic securities, insurance companies like AIG and 
various financial guarantee insurers promised to protect investors in these 
instruments through both credit derivatives and conventional insurance 
policies.44 While many banks engaged in similar activities, nonbanks led the 
charge in creating the instruments that spread risk throughout the financial 
sector. 
Nor is there any doubt that the failure or near failure of countless 
nonbank financial firms—including Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and 
 
 
 41. For a sampling of scholarship on this topic, see generally BEN S. BERNANKE, THE COURAGE 
TO ACT: A MEMOIR OF A CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH (2015); FCIC REPORT, supra note 3; TIMOTHY F. 
GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES (2014); ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, 
BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2014); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, THE END OF WALL STREET 
(2010); BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS (2011). 
 42. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 1, at 26, 40, 46, 61, 70–71. 
 43. See id. at 44–45; FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 134–37, 176–78. Goldman Sachs became a 
bank holding company at the peak of the crisis to access the Federal Reserve’s discount window. See U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-18, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BANK HOLDING 
COMPANIES: STATUTORY CHANGES TO LIMIT FUTURE SUPPORT ARE NOT YET FULLY IMPLEMENTED 40–
41 (2013), https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/659004.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; Jon Hilsenrath et al., 
Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street Model, Become Banks in Bid to Ride Out Crisis, WALL ST. J., 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122202739111460721 (last updated Sept. 22, 2008, 11:59 PM).  
 44. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 1, at 48, 74; FCIC REPORT, supra note 3, at 139–42, 200–
02, 243–44. 
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AIG—destabilized the broader financial system. Many of these nonbanks 
relied on extremely short-term funding through repo transactions, securities 
lending, or warehouse lines of credit.45 To maximize their potential return 
on—and the riskiness of—the toxic mortgage-linked securities they invested 
in, they employed massive amounts of leverage. When housing prices across 
the country declined, these nonbank companies were the first to fail, 
triggering a broader panic and necessitating massive government bailouts.46 
The financial crisis, in sum, demonstrated that nonbank financial firms can 
pose the very same types of systemic risk that were once thought to be 
exclusive to banking. 
B.  THE CONTINUING RISKS POSED BY NONBANKS 
The 2008 financial crisis may have been the first time that nonbank 
financial firms were so clearly responsible for a market crash, but it will 
almost certainly not be the last. By demonstrating that the federal 
government can and will bail out nonbank financial firms whose failure 
would exacerbate broader financial instability, the crisis increased nonbanks’ 
incentives to affirmatively become systemically significant.47 The moral 
hazard created by such a guarantee against failure is obvious to the extent 
that a failing firm’s management retains their jobs or company stock in the 
event of a bailout.48 But it is more insidious than that: any firm that markets 
believe may be bailed out by the federal government in future crises can 
borrow at favorable rates.49 Such implicitly subsidized funding, in turn, 
encourages firms to take on large risks that promise the possibility of 
correspondingly large payoffs, while externalizing the potential costs of this 
strategy onto the federal government. 
This incentive for nonbanks to embrace systemic risk is stronger than 
 
 
 45. See Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The Role of a Modern Lender of Last Resort, 116 COLUM. 
L. REV. 843, 854–55 (2016). 
 46. See BARR ET AL., supra note 1, at 62; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 1, at 69–77, 79–81, 86–
95, 99–126. 
 47. See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 437–38 (2011). 
 48. See CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS 95–99 
(2015). 
 49. Most of the empirical literature illustrating this point has focused on banks. See, e.g., João A. 
C. Santos, Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks’ “Too-Big-to-Fail” Subsidy, 20 FRBNY ECON. 
POL’Y REV., Dec. 2014, at 29, 33–38; Viral V. Acharya et al., The End of Market Discipline? Investor 
Expectations of Implicit Government Guarantees 35 (Munich Pers. RePEc Archive, Working Paper No. 
79700, 2016). But there is evidence consistent with the conclusion that these findings would apply to 
nonbank financial firms that markets expected to receive support in a crisis. See Paolo Zanghieri, The 
Value and Price of a “Too-Big-to-Fail” Guarantee: Evidence from the Insurance Industry, 4 J. FIN. 
PERSP.: INS. 21, 32–38 (2017). 
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ever, notwithstanding public promises by government officials to end 
bailouts.50 As the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis has emphasized, 
such anti-bailout pledges are simply not “credible, because tying 
policymakers’ hands without addressing the underlying risks from 
[systemically significant] firms could inflict widespread damage on the U.S. 
economy.”51 Indeed, notwithstanding claims by numerous critics that 
specific nonbank bailouts were unnecessary52 or inappropriately 
structured,53 virtually everyone agrees that the federal government had no 
responsible choice but to prop up a broad array of bank and nonbank 
financial firms in the midst of the crisis.54 Failure to do so likely would have 
caused the 2008 financial crisis to exact a toll on the economy that rivaled 
the Great Depression.55 In the event of a future systemic crisis, federal 
decisionmakers are certain to face this very same pressure. 
Not only are officials’ anti-bailout proclamations noncredible, but so 
too are provisions in Dodd-Frank that ostensibly bind officials to follow 
through on these proclamations. In a move designed to limit nonbank 
bailouts, Dodd-Frank amended section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, 
which authorizes the Federal Reserve to lend to nondepository institutions in 
“unusual and exigent circumstances . . . .”56 As revised, Federal Reserve 
officials can only invoke section 13(3) to implement programs or facilities 
with “broad-based eligibility”—meaning that at least five firms must be 
eligible to participate. They are also prohibited from using this mechanism 
to assist “a single and specific company” in avoiding insolvency 
proceedings.57 But Federal Reserve officials determined to rescue a nonbank 
financial firm could evade these restrictions by designing a broad-based 
program or facility that included the desired recipients of bailout funds. 
If this use of section 13(3) authority proved too difficult or controversial 
to implement, the Federal Reserve could instead open the discount window 
 
 
 50. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,772, 82 Fed. Reg. 9965 (Feb. 3, 2017). 
 51. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, THE MINNEAPOLIS PLAN TO END TOO BIG TO FAIL 40 
(2017). 
 52. See, e.g., DAVID A. STOCKMAN, THE GREAT DEFORMATION 3–18 (2013); Leslie Scism, Hank 
Greenberg Challenges AIG Bailout, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2014, 5:52 PM), https://www.wsj. 
com/articles/hank-greenberg-challenges-aig-bailout-1411941174. 
 53. See, e.g., NEIL BAROFSKY, BAILOUT: AN INSIDE ACCOUNT OF HOW WASHINGTON 
ABANDONED MAIN STREET WHILE RESCUING WALL STREET 178–91 (2012); SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES 
KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 169 
(Vintage Books 2011).  
 54. See Levitin, supra note 47, at 438–39. 
 55. See, e.g., GEITHNER, supra note 41, at 493–96. 
 56. See 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(A) (2018). 
 57. See id. § 343(3)(B)(iii). 
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to a teetering nonbank by facilitating that firm’s conversion to a bank holding 
company (“BHC”). Although rarely framed as a bailout, during the crisis the 
Federal Reserve successfully encouraged nonbanks like Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley to convert to BHCs.58 Doing so allowed these firms to 
borrow from the discount window against their illiquid collateral. Crucially, 
Dodd-Frank did nothing to limit the Federal Reserve’s authority to deliver 
bailouts to nonbanks in this way. And while Dodd-Frank did establish the 
Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”) as a potential alternative to bailouts, 
many are skeptical about how reliable this mechanism will prove.59 As we 
discuss later, this concern is amplified with respect to nonbanks that are not 
designated as systemically significant prior to the onset of a financial crisis.60 
One way or another, then, bailouts of nonbank financial firms can and will 
take place in future crises.61 
C.  SYSTEMIC RISK TRANSMISSION CHANNELS 
Despite the continued threats posed by nonbank financial companies, 
no consensus exists about how to identify specific nonbanks that could prove 
systemically risky amidst a financial crisis. A firm’s size is both relevant and 
nondeterminative in this inquiry. So too are a number of additional factors, 
such as a firm’s connections with the broader financial system and its 
susceptibility to run-like dynamics.62 Many observers disagree, however, 
about how to evaluate these indicia of systemic risk.63 Moreover, as we 
discuss below, systemic risk forecasting is an inherently uncertain exercise.64 
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, we can draw important conclusions 
 
 
 58. See GAO REPORT, supra note 43, at 40−41; Hilsenrath, supra note 43. 
 59. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big and Unable to Fail, 69 FLA. 
L. REV. 1205, 1223–43 (2017); see generally Thomas W. Merrill & Margaret L. Merrill, Dodd-Frank 
Orderly Liquidation Authority: Too Big for the Constitution?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 165 (2014) (raising 
constitutional objections to OLA). 
 60. See infra Section III.B.3. 
 61. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-
Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1375 (2011) (“Bailouts of large, 
systemically important financial institutions are inevitable . . . .”). 
 62. Dodd-Frank, for example, contains a list of relevant factors that FSOC must consider when 
identifying nonbanks that are systemically important. These factors include a firm’s size, leverage, off-
balance sheet exposures, counterparty exposures, activities, and reliance on short-term funding. See 12 
U.S.C. § 5323(a)(2).  
 63. Notably, finance academics have developed numerous different market-based predictors of a 
firm’s systemic importance. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Measuring Systemic Risk, 30 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 2, 6–14 (2017); Monica Billio et al., Econometric Measures of Connectedness and Systemic Risk 
in the Finance and Insurance Sectors, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 535, 538–41 (2012); Zachary Feinstein et al., 
Measures of Systemic Risk, 8 SIAM J. FIN. MATH. 672, 675–92 (2017).  
 64. See infra Section II.B. 
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about the pathways through which financial institutions might transmit 
systemic risk based on previous crises. History suggests two primary 
systemic risk transmission channels: the counterparty channel and the asset 
liquidation channel.65 While it is impossible to predict how systemic risk 
will spread in the next financial crisis, the frequency with which the 
counterparty and asset liquidation channels have propagated risks in the past 
suggests that they will remain common pathways for systemic risks in the 
future. 
1.  The Counterparty Channel 
Systemic risk spreads through the counterparty channel when a firm 
defaults on its financial obligations to counterparties and saddles them with 
losses. Firms default on their obligations in many different circumstances, 
few of which threaten financial stability. However, a nonbank financial firm 
can generate systemic risk if it experiences a run in the midst of broader 
financial market instability. 
To be vulnerable to a run, a firm normally must fund itself with some 
form of short-term liabilities payable in cash.66 Examples include repo 
transactions, securities lending, and commercial paper. In many ways, these 
short-term debts resemble bank demand deposits, the classic liability 
implicated in runs.67 Other types of short-term liabilities, such as a firm’s 
escalating need to post cash collateral, can also trigger a run.68 
In the normal scenario, a firm is subject to a run if it pairs such short-
term liabilities with long-term illiquid assets.69 Firms in this position may be 
required to dump their illiquid assets at fire-sale prices in order to raise 
enough cash to meet immediate demands by creditors. Knowing this, 
creditors will rush to claim repayment before the firm’s cash reserves run 
out, in a classic case of the prisoner’s dilemma. Creditors’ uncertainty about 
 
 
 65. FSOC Guidance, supra note 15, at pt. 1310, app. A.II.a. 
 66. In 2008, a variety of short-term obligations triggered runs at nonbanks, including repo 
financing and prime brokerage accounts at leading U.S. investment banks, securities lending by AIG’s 
insurance subsidiaries, and money market mutual fund shares redeemable at par. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra 
note 1, at 88–89, 103–05; Lawrence Schmidt et al., Runs on Money Market Mutual Funds, 106 AM. ECON. 
REV. 2625, 2625–29 (2016); Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1571 n.1, 1585–86. 
 67. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 
91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 401–02 (1983).  
 68. See infra Section IV.A. 
 69. In the traditional theory of financial intermediation, institutions transform short-term, private 
liabilities into long-term loans. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. CECCHETTI & KERMIT SCHOENHOLTZ, MONEY, 
BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 39 (3d ed. 2010). For an alternative theory, see Robert C. Hockett 
& Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1144–49 (2017) (comparing 
the modern financial system to a franchise arrangement). 
 2019] REGULATING ENTITIES AND ACTIVITIES 1471 
the firm’s true financial health will exacerbate this stampede. Unless the 
firm’s asset sales generate enough cash to cover its obligations (which is 
unlikely) and absent a bailout, the firm will default. 
Runs at nonbanks are likely to propagate systemic risk through the 
counterparty channel if two conditions are met. First, the nonbank firm must 
have large positions with counterparties that are themselves potentially 
important players in the financial system. Only in such cases will the losses 
inflicted on counterparties due to the nonbank’s default be large enough to 
jeopardize their solvency, potentially setting off a chain reaction. 
Second, for systemic risk to spread through the counterparty channel, 
the broader financial system must already be in a weakened state when the 
nonbank firm experiences a run. This makes the company’s impending 
failure systemic, not idiosyncratic, in nature. Nonbank financial companies 
fail for all sorts of reasons, few of which end up threatening financial 
stability. The idiosyncratic failure of even a large and highly interconnected 
nonbank financial firm generally will not threaten to bring down its 
counterparties. But when the firm’s counterparties and the broader financial 
system are already so financially precarious that they lack the resilience or 
capital to absorb losses, the firm’s collapse could jeopardize financial 
stability.70 
2.  The Asset Liquidation Channel 
The second major conduit for systemic risk is the asset liquidation 
channel. In this channel, a nonbank firm—or a group of similarly situated 
nonbank firms—liquidates enough assets in a single asset class to send prices 
into freefall. If the price drop is steep enough, other firms holding the same 
asset could sustain losses and face insolvency. 
A firm can transmit systemic risk through the asset liquidation channel 
if two conditions are met. First, a significant subset of financial firms must 
have correlated asset holdings. Only then can a group of nonbanks with 
similar investments generate instability, harming other investors in that asset 
class, by dumping those assets simultaneously. Second, the ensuing losses 
must wipe out the capital of a critical mass of firms, causing insolvencies. 
For this to happen, the financial system generally must be in a weakened 
state. 
When these two conditions are met, several different scenarios can 
 
 
 70. See Brief of Professors Viral V. Acharya et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 20–
21, MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 1:15-cv-00045-RMC, 2018 WL 1052618 (D.C. Cir. 
Jan. 23, 2018) (No. 16-5086) [hereinafter Acharya Br.]. 
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trigger asset liquidations that could generate systemic risk. The first is a run, 
which can figure just as prominently in the asset liquidation channel as in the 
counterparty channel. When a company attempts to staunch a run by selling 
off assets to pay creditors, the downward pressure on asset prices impairs 
other firms with similar holdings.71 In other cases, one or more firms could 
transmit risk through the asset liquidation channel without themselves 
experiencing financial distress. This could occur due to herd investing 
behavior, where firms crowd into popular asset classes and sell, en masse, 
less popular assets.72 Alternatively, firms responding to regulatory or rating 
agency pressures to divest certain holdings could trigger the asset liquidation 
channel.73 In another scenario, a firm might intentionally manipulate the 
price of an asset. Thus, a nonbank firm or group of firms with the power to 
move prices by dumping financial assets could be systemically significant 
even if they are not particularly vulnerable to financial distress during a 
broader financial downturn. 
To summarize, not every nonbank financial firm poses systemic risk. 
Rather, a nonbank financial firm’s systemic significance is likely to hinge on 
its propensity to transmit instability through the counterparty or asset 
liquidation channels.74 This propensity, in turn, will depend on the unique 
characteristics of the company’s balance sheet structure, its connections to 
other financial institutions, and its ability to affect the prices of financial 
assets. 
II.  TRACING FSOC’S MOVE FROM AN ENTITY-BASED TO AN 
ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACH TO NONBANK SYSTEMIC RISK 
This Part examines post-crisis reforms to mitigate nonbank systemic 
risk in the United States and abroad. Section II.A introduces FSOC and its 
dual entity- and activity-based authorities for responding to nonbank 
systemic risk. It details how both FSOC and its international counterparts 
have recently deemphasized an entity-based approach in favor of an 
 
 
 71. See Viral V. Acharya, A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation, 
5 J. FIN. STABILITY 224, 225 (2009). 
 72. See GERDING, supra note 41, at 311–36. 
 73. See id. 
 74. FSOC has posited a third potential transmission channel where a firm is no longer able or 
willing to provide a critical function or service that market actors rely on and for which there are no ready 
substitutes. See FSOC Guidance, supra note 15, at pt. 1310, app. A.II.a. This critical function or service 
channel will most commonly arise when the firm in question is a dominant financial intermediary—for 
example, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—or financial market utility, such as a payments clearing operator. 
Partly for this reason, FSOC has designated a number of financial market utilities as systemically 
important. See Financial Market Utility Designations, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx#FMU (last visited Sept. 17, 2019). 
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activities-based approach. Section II.B then describes efforts in the United 
States to permanently undermine FSOC’s entity-based approach by 
establishing nearly insurmountable procedural requirements for future 
designations of nonbank SIFIs. 
A.  EVOLUTION OF FSOC’S ENTITY- AND ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACHES 
After the crisis, lawmakers quickly moved to address financial stability 
risks arising from nonbanks. The centerpiece of their efforts was the creation 
of FSOC in the Dodd-Frank Act. The Act empowered FSOC to designate 
nonbank financial entities as systemically significant, an authority that has 
come to be known as the “entity-based” approach. This authority, of course, 
mirrors traditional financial regulation, which attaches different regulatory 
regimes to different types of financial firms.75 Dodd-Frank also authorized 
FSOC to make nonbinding recommendations to primary financial regulators 
regarding the treatment of nonbank financial activities that raise systemic 
risk concerns. This is FSOC’s so-called “activities-based” authority. 
FSOC has varied over time in how it has exercised its entity- and 
activities-based authorities. Initially, FSOC focused on its entity-based 
authority, but more recently it has backed off from that approach. This 
troubling evolution away from entity-based nonbank regulation has occurred 
not only domestically but also among international financial regulators and 
organizations. 
FSOC’s entity-based authority allows it to designate nonbank 
companies as SIFIs.76 Under section 113 of Dodd-Frank, FSOC may 
designate a nonbank financial company if the firm “could pose a threat to the 
financial stability of the United States” in one of two ways: (1) in the event 
of its “material financial distress” (the “First Determination Standard”) or 
(2) based on “the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, 
interconnectedness, or mix of [its] activities” (the “Second Determination 
Standard”).77 Thus, the First Determination Standard allows FSOC to 
designate a firm whose failure could create systemic risk. By contrast, the 
Second Determination Standard permits the designation of a firm whose 
operations could transmit financial stability risks, even if the company itself 
 
 
 75. See Jackson, supra note 9, at 364–66. 
 76. Dodd-Frank does not itself use the term “SIFI,” but the term is commonly used to refer to 
entities designated under Section 113 of Dodd-Frank.  
 77. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2018). A two-thirds majority of FSOC’s voting members is required 
to designate a firm under either determination standard. Id. For an administrative law analysis of FSOC’s 
section 113 designation power, see Robert F. Weber, The FSOC’s Designation Program as a Case Study 
of the New Administrative Law of Financial Supervision, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 370–94 (2019). 
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does not fail. Although the Second Determination Standard focuses on an 
individual firm’s mix of “activities,” it is part of Dodd-Frank’s entity-based, 
rather than activities-based, approach because it specifies one avenue for 
designating an individual firm as a SIFI. 
Any firm that FSOC designates as a nonbank SIFI becomes subject to 
consolidated supervision and regulation by the Federal Reserve.78 Critically, 
the Federal Reserve’s oversight of nonbank SIFIs targets financial stability 
risks. This macroprudential orientation is important because traditional 
nonbank regulation, such as state-based insurance regulation and SEC 
oversight of broker-dealers, is not designed to address risks to financial 
stability.79 Instead, nonbank financial oversight generally focuses on other 
goals, such as solvency and market conduct.80 The Federal Reserve, by 
contrast, applies risk-based capital requirements, liquidity requirements, 
stress tests, overall risk management standards, and other macroprudential 
tools to prevent nonbank SIFIs from transmitting systemic risk through the 
broader economy.81 
In the years immediately following the crisis, FSOC wielded its entity-
based designation power aggressively. In one of its first major actions, the 
Council established a process for evaluating whether a company could pose 
a threat to U.S. financial stability under either determination standard.82 
After finalizing its designation procedures, FSOC quickly began evaluating 
nonbank financial companies. In 2013, it designated insurance-focused 
companies AIG and Prudential, as well as General Electric’s captive finance 
subsidiary, GE Capital.83 The following year, FSOC added MetLife, Inc., 
 
 
 78. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(b)(1)(A).  
 79. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 1, at 725; Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1627–34. Broadly 
speaking, macroprudential regulation addresses the stability of the financial system as a whole, while 
microprudential regulation focuses on the stability of individual financial institutions. See Jacek Osiński 
et al., Int’l Monetary Fund, Macroprudential and Microprudential Policies: Toward Cohabitation, 4, 
SDN 2013/05 (June 2013). 
 80. See infra Section III.B.4. 
 81. See 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a). 
 82. See FSOC Guidance, supra note 15, at pt. 1310, app. A. 
 83. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT 
COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. (2013), https 
://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Basis%20of%20Final%20Determination
%20Regarding%20American%20International%20Group,%20Inc.pdf [hereinafter AIG DESIGNATION]; 
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S 
FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITAL CORPORATION, INC. (2013), https:// 
www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Basis%20of%20Final%20Determination%2
0Regarding%20General%20Electric%20Capital%20Corporation,%20Inc.pdf [hereinafter GE CAPITAL 
DESIGNATION]; FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT 
COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. (2013), https://www. 
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another insurance-focused firm.84 FSOC concluded that material financial 
distress at each of these firms could threaten U.S. financial stability under 
the First Determination Standard, but it did not evaluate any of these firms 
under the Second Determination Standard.85 FSOC closely analyzed five 
additional firms but ultimately opted not to designate them.86 
International financial regulators adopted a similar entity-based 
orientation to nonbank systemic risk in the years after the crisis. The 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (“IAIS”), for example, 
developed a methodology for identifying global systemically important 
insurers (“G-SIIs”) at the urging of the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”).87 
Beginning in 2013, the IAIS published annual lists of such firms, identifying 
nine G-SIIs, including AIG, MetLife, and Prudential.88 The IAIS and FSB 
instructed the G-SIIs’ home country regulators to subject these firms to 
enhanced macroprudential oversight.89 
In contrast to its early entity-based designations, the Obama 
Administration FSOC rarely used its authority to recommend that primary 
financial regulators implement activities-based reforms. Under section 120 
of Dodd-Frank, FSOC may “issu[e] recommendations to the primary 
financial regulatory agencies to apply new or heightened standards and 
safeguards” to any activity that could increase risks in the financial sector.90 
 
 
treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Prudential%20Financial%20Inc.pdf [hereinafter 
PRUDENTIAL DESIGNATION]. 
 84. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT 
COUNCIL’S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING METLIFE, INC. (2014), https://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/MetLife%20Public%20Basis.pdf [hereinafter METLIFE 
DESIGNATION]. 
 85. See AIG DESIGNATION, supra note 83, at 4; GE CAPITAL DESIGNATION, supra note 83, at 4; 
PRUDENTIAL DESIGNATION, supra note 83, at 5; METLIFE DESIGNATION, supra note 84, at 4. 
 86. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 120 (2017), https://www. 
treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/FSOC_2017_Annual_Report.pdf [hereinafter 
FSOC 2017 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
 87. See generally INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT 
INSURERS (2013), https://www.fsb.org/2016/06/global-systemically-important-insurers-updated-assess 
ment-methodology. Paralleling FSOC’s First Determination Standard, the IAIS and FSB defined G-SIIs 
as insurers whose “distress or failure would cause significant dislocation in the global financial 
system . . . .” See id. at 3 n.1. 
 88. See Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs), FIN. STABILITY BOARD, 
http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/policy-development/systematically-important-financial-institutions-
sifis/global-systemically-important-financial-institutions-g-sifis (last visited Sept. 17, 2019). 
 89. See FIN. STABILITY BD., REDUCING THE MORAL HAZARD POSED BY SYSTEMICALLY 
IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (2010), https://www.fsb.org/2010/11/r_101111a. 
 90. 12 U.S.C. § 5330(a) (2018). FSOC may identify an activity for heightened regulation if it 
determines that “the conduct, scope, nature, size, scale, concentration, or interconnectedness of such 
activity or practice could create or increase the risk of significant liquidity, credit, or other problems” in 
the financial sector. Id. 
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Critically, however, the primary financial regulators are not obligated to 
adopt FSOC’s activities-based recommendations.91 Nor does FSOC have 
authority to write rules governing financial activities on its own. FSOC’s 
activities-based powers, therefore, are no more potent than recommendations 
by an advisory council. 
The Obama-era FSOC used its section 120 activities-based authority 
only once. In 2012, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner asked FSOC to 
recommend regulations for MMMFs after the SEC declined to adopt long-
anticipated rules for these funds.92 Exercising its section 120 power, FSOC 
requested public comment on regulatory approaches to mitigate systemic 
risk posed by MMMFs.93 The SEC responded to FSOC’s recommendations 
by adopting its own MMMF reforms the following year.94 
FSOC considered—but declined to pursue—other activities-based 
recommendations during the Obama Administration. In late 2014, for 
example, FSOC sought public comment on whether the products and 
activities of asset managers, including hedge funds, could pose a risk to 
financial stability.95 In response to public input, FSOC created an 
interagency working group to monitor the use of leverage by hedge funds 
and analyze the sufficiency of hedge funds’ data reporting.96 FSOC, 
however, stopped short of recommending enhanced regulations of any asset 
managers’ activities.97 
Opponents of FSOC’s entity-based designations seized on the 
Council’s sparing use of its section 120 authority and urged it to use an 
activities-based approach in lieu of designating nonbank SIFIs. Activities-
 
 
 91. 12 U.S.C. § 5330(c)(2). 
 92. See Kirsten Grind, Funds Face New Battle on Rules, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10000872396390443493304578038410540850592 (last updated Oct. 5, 2012, 6:54 PM). 
MMMFs are specialized pooled investment vehicles that typically invest in low-risk assets such as 
commercial paper and government securities. See Hester Peirce & Robert Greene, Opening the Gate to 
Money Market Fund Reform, 34 PACE L. REV. 1093, 1093 (2014). 
 93. See Proposed Recommendations Regarding Money Market Mutual Fund Reform, 77 Fed. Reg. 
69,455, 69,455 (Nov. 19, 2012). 
 94. For the SEC release adopting these reforms, see generally Money Market Fund Reform; 
Amendments to Form PF, Securities Act Release No. 9616, Investment Company Act Release No. 31166, 
79 Fed. Reg. 47,736 (Aug. 14, 2014). The SEC’s MMMF rules, however, were less stringent than the 
approaches FSOC had proposed. See Allen, supra note 5, at 1119. 
 95. See Notice Seeking Comment on Asset Management Products and Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 
77,488, 77,488−89 (Dec. 24, 2014). 
 96. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, UPDATE ON REVIEW OF ASSET MANAGEMENT 
PRODUCTS AND ACTIVITIES 20–21 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/news/Documents/ 
FSOC%20Update%20on%20Review%20of%20Asset%20Management%20Products%20and%20Activi
ties.pdf. 
 97. See id. 
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based regulation, these critics insisted, would more effectively mitigate 
nonbank risks by providing clear guidance about how a broad range of 
financial firms could mitigate their systemic significance.98 By contrast, 
opponents contended that the entity-based approach was fundamentally 
flawed. For example, critics argued that it created an uneven playing field 
for designated firms, who would be unable to compete with firms not subject 
to enhanced regulation.99 Moreover, critics feared that the Federal Reserve—
traditionally a bank regulator—would subject SIFIs to bank-centric 
regulations, which they insisted would be inappropriate for a nonbank 
business model.100 Finally, opponents alleged that FSOC’s designation 
process was opaque, arbitrary, political, and driven by the FSB, effectively 
outsourcing domestic regulatory decisions to international policymakers.101 
Criticism of FSOC’s entity-based designation authority was particularly 
pronounced in the financial sector and among conservative political 
commentators. Prior to MetLife’s designation, for example, the firm’s CEO 
implored FSOC to “adopt an activities-based approach to systemic risk, 
rather than an institutions-based approach.”102 Sometimes, conservative 
critics confused FSOC’s section 120 activities-based authority with its power 
to designate a nonbank SIFI based on its activities under section 113’s 
Second Determination Standard.103 This confusion, in turn, created a 
misimpression that FSOC had direct statutory authority to implement an 
activities-based approach.104 Other critics argued that the best way to limit 
nonbank systemic risk is through an activities-based approach, and FSOC 
and international regulators should therefore abandon their efforts to 
 
 
 98. See, e.g., The Arbitrary and Inconsistent Non-Bank SIFI Designation Process: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 5 (2017) 
[hereinafter Holtz-Eakin Statement] (statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, President, American Action 
Forum). 
 99. See, e.g., Dirk A. Kempthorne, Designating Life Insurers as SIFIs Creates Uneven Playing 
Field, AM. BANKER: BANKTHINK (Aug. 22, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/ 
opinion/designating-life-insurers-as-sifis-creates-uneven-playing-field. 
 100. See Steven A. Kandarian, Chairman, President and CEO, MetLife, Inc., Keynote Address at 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Capital Markets Summit: Life Insurers as SIFIs: A Case of Mistaken 
Identity? 1−2 (Apr. 10, 2013) (on file with authors). For a discussion of the Federal Reserve’s role as a 
bank regulator, see PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
158–75 (Princeton Univ. Press 2018). 
 101. See The Arbitrary and Inconsistent Non-Bank SIFI Designation Process: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 48 (2017) 
(statement of Alex J. Pollock, Distinguished Senior Fellow, R Street Institute). 
 102. See Kandarian, supra note 100. 
 103. See, e.g., Wallison, supra note 20 (mischaracterizing the Trump Administration’s proposed 
shift to section 113 activities-based regulation as an exercise of its section 120 entity-based authority 
using the Second Determination Standard). 
 104. See id.  
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designate individual firms as systemically significant.105 Critics, in sum, 
portrayed an activities-based approach as an alternative, rather than a 
complement, to the entity-based approach. 
Over time, these criticisms have evolved into a seeming consensus 
among policymakers that FSOC should focus on an activities-based 
approach in lieu of entity-based designations. With President Trump’s 
financial regulatory nominees serving as voting members of FSOC, a 
majority of the Council now holds this view. In fact, FSOC has shifted its 
focus to activities-based regulation in two different ways. 
First, FSOC reversed all of its entity-based designations, freeing each 
of the previously-designated nonbank SIFIs from Federal Reserve oversight. 
Even before President Trump’s election, FSOC voted unanimously to 
rescind GE Capital’s designation after the company shrunk by more than half 
and substantially simplified its activities in an effort to reduce its systemic 
footprint.106 More controversially, after many of President Trump’s 
nominees took office, FSOC voted 6–3 to rescind AIG’s designation.107 
Later, FSOC freed MetLife from enhanced regulation by dropping its appeal 
of a district court order overturning the company’s designation on procedural 
grounds.108 Finally, the Council rescinded Prudential’s SIFI designation in 
late 2018, leaving no remaining nonbank SIFIs.109 
Second, FSOC is in the process of adopting formal policies prioritizing 
 
 
 105. See, e.g., Holtz-Eakin Statement, supra note 98, at 6−7. 
 106. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS FOR THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT 
COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION REGARDING GE CAPITAL GLOBAL HOLDINGS, LLC 2 
(2016), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/GE%20Capital%20Public%2 
0Rescission%20Basis.pdf. 
 107. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTICE AND EXPLANATION OF THE BASIS FOR THE 
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION REGARDING 
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. 12 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designatio 
ns/Documents/American_International_Group,_Inc._(Rescission).pdf; cf. Gregg Gelzinis, Deregulating 
AIG Was a Mistake, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 11, 2017, 9:01 AM), https://www.americanprog 
ress.org/issues/economy/reports/2017/10/11/440570/deregulating-aig-mistake (arguing that AIG did not 
sufficiently simplify itself to warrant de-designation).  
 108. See Alistair Gray, Trump Administration Drops Appeal in MetLife ‘Too Big to Fail’ Case, FIN. 
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/cfc31764-ff65-351d-95f2-78e7b413af4f. 
 109. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, NOTICE AND EXPLANATION OF THE BASIS FOR THE 
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL’S RESCISSION OF ITS DETERMINATION REGARDING 
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC. 2 (2018), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/Prudential-Financial-
Inc-Rescission.pdf. Jeremy Kress has argued that Prudential’s de-designation was arbitrary and 
capricious because the Council violated its procedural rules, relied on misleading quantitative analyses, 
and ignored a mandatory statutory factor. See Jeremy C. Kress, The Last SIFI: The Unwise and Illegal 
Deregulation of Prudential Financial, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 171, 175−82 (2018). For further analysis 
of FSOC’s de-designation of nonbank SIFIs, see David Zaring, The Federal Deregulation of Insurance, 
97 TEX. L. REV. 125, 135−54 (2018). 
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its section 120 activities-based authority over its section 113 designation 
power. In early 2017, President Trump directed FSOC to discontinue new 
nonbank SIFI designations while the Treasury Department conducted a 
thorough review of FSOC’s designation process.110 Several months later, the 
Treasury Department issued recommendations that would fundamentally 
change FSOC’s approach to nonbank systemic risk.111 Calling entity-based 
designations “a blunt instrument” for addressing systemic risk, the Treasury 
Department urged FSOC to prioritize an activities-based approach and to 
resort to entity-based designations in exceedingly rare circumstances.112 
FSOC proposed formal guidance adopting substantially all of the Treasury 
Department’s recommendations in March 2019 (“the FSOC Proposal”).113 
FSOC, however, has not issued any new activities-based recommendations 
in the interim. 
Mirroring these domestic developments, international policymakers 
have also deemphasized entity-based approaches to nonbank regulation.114 
Just one week after the Treasury Department’s report, the FSB announced 
that it would not publish a new list of G-SIIs for 2017 in light of “work being 
undertaken by the IAIS to develop an Activities-Based Approach to systemic 
risk in the insurance sector . . . .”115 Such an approach, the FSB cryptically 
suggested, “may have significant implications for the assessment of systemic 
risk in the insurance sector and hence for the identification of G-SIIs and for 
G-SII policy measures.”116 A few weeks later, the IAIS issued a public 
consultation document that laid out broad principles for implementing an 
activities-based approach in the insurance sector.117 
 
 
 110. See Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of the Treasury: Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-
secretary-treasury. 
 111. For these recommendations, see generally TREASURY FSOC REPORT, supra note 21. 
 112. Id. at 19–21. Specifically, the Treasury Department recommended that FSOC follow a three-
step process: (1) prioritize reviews of potential stability risks from financial activities and products; (2) 
work with primary financial regulators to address identified risks, including through section 120 
activities-based recommendations if necessary; and (3) consider individual firms for designation only if 
consultation with the primary regulators is insufficient to mitigate risks to financial stability. See id. 
 113. See generally FSOC Proposal, supra note 25, at 9028 (proposing the prioritization of an 
activities-based approach). 
 114. For a full account of the international shift away from entity-based nonbank systemic risk 
regulation, see generally Kress, McCoy & Schwarcz, supra note 28. 
 115. Press Release, Fin. Stability Bd., FSB Statement on Identification of Global Systemically 
Important Insurers (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.fsb.org/2017/11/fsb-statement-on-identification-of-
global-systemically-important-insurers.  
 116. Id. 
 117. See generally INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACH TO SYSTEMIC 
RISK (2017), https://www.iaisweb.org/page/consultations/closed-consultations/2018/activities-based-ap 
proach-to-systemic-risk//file/70440/interim-aba-cp-final-for-launch. 
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In sum, policymakers have completely transformed their approach to 
nonbank systemic risk in the years since the crisis. FSOC initially deployed 
its entity-based authority with marked success, resulting in firms like GE 
Capital and, to a lesser extent, AIG reducing their systemic footprints to 
escape SIFI designation. Yet entity-based designations have fallen out of 
favor, and policymakers have coalesced around a new consensus that 
systemic risk regulation should focus on an activities-based approach. New 
entity-based designations have ceased and policymakers have proposed 
policies that could eliminate or substantially deemphasize designations in the 
future. 
B.  NEW PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO FSOC’S ENTITY-BASED AUTHORITY 
Proponents of the shift to activities-based nonbank systemic risk 
regulation hope to permanently erect procedural barriers to nonbank SIFI 
designations. Most recently, the Trump Administration proposed that FSOC 
(1) conduct various quantitative assessments when considering whether a 
firm’s material financial distress could threaten U.S. financial stability, and 
(2) perform a quantitative cost-benefit analysis of each designation.118 If 
enacted, these new policies would slow FSOC’s evaluation of nonbank 
financial companies, increase the litigation risk associated with new 
designations, and significantly undermine the feasibility of an entity-based 
approach.119 
1.  New Procedural Requirements for Designation 
The First Determination Standard under section 113 of Dodd-Frank—
which authorizes designation if FSOC “determines that material financial 
distress at” a nonbank “could pose a threat to the financial stability of the 
United States”120—has formed the basis for all four nonbank SIFI 
designations to date.121 The Trump Administration, however, has proposed 
attaching two prerequisites to determinations under this standard: a threshold 
vulnerability analysis and a series of quantitative assessments. Both 
prerequisites depart from the mandates of Dodd-Frank and would 
 
 
 118. See FSOC Proposal, supra note 25, at 9041−46; TREASURY FSOC REPORT, supra note 21, at 
26–28. 
 119. For additional analysis of the Trump Administration’s proposal to impede nonbank SIFI 
designations, see generally Financial Stability Oversight Council Nonbank Designations: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 116th Cong. (2019) (testimony of Professor Jeremy 
C. Kress). 
 120. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 121. See AIG DESIGNATION, supra note 83, at 4; GE CAPITAL DESIGNATION, supra note 83, at 4; 
METLIFE DESIGNATION, supra note 84, at 4; PRUDENTIAL DESIGNATION, supra note 83, at 5.  
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substantially undermine the practical ability of FSOC to designate nonbank 
SIFIs in the future. 
The first new procedural requirement proposed by the Trump 
Administration is that FSOC assess a firm’s likelihood of financial distress 
as a “threshold question” in the nonbank SIFI designation process.122 The 
Trump Administration contends that “[s]ound risk regulation requires 
consideration of not only the impact of an identifiable risk, but also the 
likelihood that the risk will be realized.”123 Reading between the lines, the 
Trump Administration is signaling that FSOC should refrain from 
designating a firm unless the company is likely to experience material 
financial distress.124 
However, such a threshold “vulnerability” analysis conflicts with 
Dodd-Frank’s text. Dodd-Frank does not instruct FSOC to evaluate the 
likelihood that a nonbank financial firm will experience material financial 
distress. To the contrary, Congress directed FSOC to assume that the firm is 
in distress and analyze whether that distress “could pose a threat” to U.S. 
financial stability.125 
The Trump Administration’s proposed vulnerability analysis would 
undermine FSOC’s ability to prevent a systemically significant failure 
through designation. Congress had good reason for instructing FSOC to 
conduct its designation analysis by assuming financial distress at a company. 
It wanted FSOC to take a precautionary approach by considering designation 
where a nonbank financial firm could—not would—threaten U.S. financial 
stability.126 This safeguard is eminently sensible, because the FSOC 
designation process is inherently lengthy and results in regulation and 
supervision of designated firms by an entirely separate entity: the Federal 
Reserve. Consequently, there will inevitably be a substantial time gap 
between a firm’s initial designation and the implementation of enhanced 
regulation and supervision for that firm. A system that reacts to systemically 
risky firms only years after they become vulnerable to failure is certain to be 
ineffective.127 
 
 
 122. TREASURY FSOC REPORT, supra note 21, at 26; see also FSOC Proposal, supra note 25, at 
9044−45 (proposing that the Council assess a potential designee’s likelihood of material financial 
distress). 
 123. TREASURY FSOC REPORT, supra note 21, at 26. 
 124. See id. at 27; see also FSOC Proposal, supra note 25, at 9044−45. 
 125. 12 U.S.C. § 5323(a)(1). 
 126. Yet another concern is that requiring FSOC to estimate a firm’s chance of distress could 
perversely increase the risk of a run by signaling questions about a designated company’s solvency.  
 127. Indeed, a central principle of effective financial regulation is that regulators must intervene 
quickly when a firm is in trouble, as firms approaching insolvency have strong incentives to gamble for 
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The second way that the Trump Administration recommended adding 
hurdles to Dodd-Frank’s designation process was by suggesting that, as part 
of any future designation, FSOC should be required to conduct a series of 
quantitative assessments. This includes not only the threshold vulnerability 
analysis described above, but also various statistical analyses designed to 
illustrate how a firm’s distress would reverberate throughout the U.S. 
financial system. For instance, the Trump Administration suggested that 
FSOC should be required to “quantify the losses that each of [a firm’s] 
counterparties would suffer in the event of its distress,” including any factors 
that would reduce losses to the counterparties.128 And it suggested requiring 
quantitative evaluations of “the means by which a company’s asset fire sale 
could disrupt trading or funding markets or cause significant losses or 
funding problems for other companies with similar holdings.”129 
The Trump Administration embraced these reforms after MetLife 
successfully challenged its SIFI designation in court based on FSOC’s 
refusal to perform similar analyses. In MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability 
Oversight Council,130 the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
found FSOC’s designation of MetLife arbitrary and capricious because 
FSOC failed to consider the statistical probability of MetLife experiencing 
material financial distress or the magnitude of the ensuing losses to 
MetLife’s counterparties.131 The court required FSOC to statistically 
estimate these ensuing losses “based on reasoned predictions,” stating that 
“a summary of exposures and assets is not a prediction.”132 Effectively, the 
court insisted that FSOC use multivariate regression analysis, not descriptive 
statistics, to analyze how a firm’s distress could impact the broader financial 
system.133 
As a district court opinion, the MetLife ruling holds limited precedential 
value and does not necessarily bind FSOC in the future.134 But by proposing 
that FSOC formally adopt the court’s analysis through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, the Trump Administration would elevate it to a binding feature 
 
 
resurrection. See George W. Downs & David M. Rocke, Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for 
Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362, 375 (1994). 
 128. TREASURY FSOC REPORT, supra note 21, at 24. 
 129. Id. at 11. 
 130. MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 177 F. Supp. 3d 219 (D.D.C. 2016).  
 131. Id. at 233–39. 
 132. Id. at 237.  
 133. FSOC initially appealed the district court’s decision but later dropped its appeal after President 
Trump took office. MetLife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, No. 16-5086, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 
162, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 23, 2018). 
 134. See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (discussing the precedential weight 
of a federal district court decision). 
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of future FSOC designations.135  
Mandatory quantitative projections of the type envisioned by the 
MetLife decision and proposed by the Trump Administration would 
effectively require the impossible as a condition of future designations. 
Simply put, officials cannot reliably predict the probability that any one 
nonbank will experience material financial distress that will have systemic 
consequences for the broader financial system. This is because much of 
systemic risk oversight operates on the frontiers of what the economist Frank 
H. Knight termed “the unknowable.” 
Nearly a century ago, Knight distinguished predictions that are 
amenable to probability analysis from those that are not. According to 
Knight, two types of predictions can be analyzed probabilistically. The first, 
known knowns, involves deductions about the future that follow 
mathematical rules or established laws of science.136 The second, known 
unknowns, involves forecasts that can be induced empirically using 
statistics.137 Such statistical analyses require enough similar prior 
occurrences to permit statistical inferences with a sufficient degree of 
confidence. Even when this condition is met, statistical predictions entail 
higher potential error than the logical mathematical rules of probability that 
apply to known knowns.138 Further, while statistical forecasts can predict 
how many people in a group will experience an event, they cannot identify 
exactly who will experience it.139 
A third category of predictions—unknowables—involves so many 
factors that it is impossible to formulate probability forecasts.140 The 
“conception of an objectively measurable probability or chance” in this 
situation “is simply inapplicable.”141 Knight referred to this as uncertainty 
and distinguished it from risk, which involves the measurable certainty that 
is entailed in known unknowns.142 
 
 
 135.  In its proposed guidance, the Council asked for public comment on whether it should “interpret 
its authority under section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act in a manner that is consistent with the opinion of 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight 
Council . . . .” FSOC Proposal, supra note 25, at 9035. 
 136. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 6, 214–15, 224–25 (Dover Publ’ns, Inc. 
2006) (1921). Known knowns are almost never found in the economic realm. Instead, they are normally 
restricted to certain physical phenomena such as the law of gravity. Id. at 210–24. 
 137. Id. at 6, 215, 224–25. 
 138. Id. at 215, 230–31. 
 139. Id. at 217.  
 140. Id. at 218. 
 141. Id. at 231. 
 142. Id. at 19–20, 233. 
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The MetLife opinion and the Trump Administration’s probability 
analysis recommendations are deaf to the fact that major elements of 
systemic risk lie in the realm of uncertainty rather than risk. Thus, when the 
Trump Administration calls on FSOC to calculate the statistical likelihood 
of a firm experiencing material financial distress that could trigger a chain 
reaction, or to quantify the precise pathways of such a chain reaction, it 
makes herculean demands. This is because systemic failures only occur 
when the broader financial system is unstable and other financial firms are 
too weak to survive losses.143 As a result, the likelihood of systemic failure 
cannot be modeled without predicting the chance that crisis conditions will 
already exist in the larger financial system. 
It is impossible, however, to statistically estimate the likelihood, 
magnitude, or timing of a future financial crisis.144 Sample size is one barrier. 
Unless the sample is sufficiently large, reliable statistical inferences cannot 
be drawn.145 This problem is insurmountable when it comes to nonbank 
firms, which did not manifest systemic risk (with rare exceptions) before 
2008 and thus are relatively new objects of systemic concern.146 
Further complicating the statistical task, analysts would have to 
consider far too many potential explanatory variables to draw inferences 
with confidence.147 In the systemic risk context, there are a virtually infinite 
number of explanatory factors that can predict a future financial crisis or 
losses to a firm’s counterparties.148 Innumerable permutations of events 
might make financial companies fragile. Some of those scenarios are known 
from past experience, but others are unknown and cannot be anticipated, 
making any forecast too conservative. Moreover, because the timing of 
 
 
 143. FSOC’s guidance makes clear that it assesses the impact of the company’s material financial 
distress “in the context of a period of overall stress in the financial services industry and in a weak 
macroeconomic environment.” FSOC Guidance, supra note 15, at pt. 1310, app. A.II.b. 
 144. See Acharya Br., supra note 70, at 12; see also DAVID ORRELL, THE FUTURE OF EVERYTHING 
7–8, 112–13, 169, 243 (2007) (describing mathematically why financial systems are too complex to be 
predictable); Serena Ng & Jonathan H. Wright, Facts and Challenges from the Great Recession for 
Forecasting and Macroeconomic Modeling, 51 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, 1140–50 (2013) (analyzing 
impediments to statistical forecasts of financial crises).  
 145. See, e.g., DOUGLAS C. MONTGOMERY & GEORGE C. RUNGER, APPLIED STATISTICS AND 
PROBABILITY FOR ENGINEERS 312–21 (2d ed. 1999); Ng & Wright, supra note 144, at 1144. 
 146. See supra Part I. One potential exception is Long-Term Capital Management in 1998. See 
generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT (2000) (providing an extensive history of Long-Term Capital Management). 
 147. In statistical terms, analysts would have too few degrees of freedom to take all of the possible 
disaster scenarios into account. See, e.g., What Are Degrees of Freedom in Statistics?, MINITAB BLOG 
(Apr. 8, 2016), http://blog.minitab.com/blog/statistics-and-quality-data-analysis/what-are-degrees-of-
freedom-in-statistics. 
 148. See Ng & Wright, supra note 144, at 1146. 
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crises is hard to predict, statisticians would have to compute their projections 
for multiple and often distant points in the future. 
The analysis could not stop there, because financial crises have a large 
behavioral element. Next, statisticians would have to predict how other 
market participants would react if the counterparties’ solvency was in doubt 
and the counterparties’ responses to those reactions. The often irrational 
nature of market actors’ reactions and the many assumptions that would need 
to be made would relegate any such projections to guesswork. In short, there 
would be far too many potential explanatory variables to make accurate 
predictions under these circumstances, particularly given the small sample 
size available. 
Because material financial distress (in the systemic sense) cannot occur 
outside of crisis conditions, any attempt to statistically model an individual 
company’s systemic distress would be subject to question. Further, even if a 
financial catastrophe could be forecasted, that forecast would only apply to 
financial firms in the aggregate, not to specific firms. Nothing in that forecast 
would tell us that MetLife, for instance, would be the one to trigger that crisis 
instead of another firm. Even the Trump Administration has conceded this 
point, stating that “[t]here is no proven method for predicting with precision 
the effect that the failure of any nonbank financial company will have on 
financial stability.”149 
To summarize, the Trump Administration and the MetLife court would 
require the impossible of FSOC by insisting that it statistically calculate both 
the probability of any distress at a nonbank that could threaten financial 
stability and the pathways by which such distress might spread. In the 
process, they have brought FSOC’s ability to designate nonbank SIFIs to a 
halt and opened up any future designations to the prospect of judicial 
challenge. 
2.  A New Cost-Benefit Requirement 
The Trump Administration also recommended that, prior to any future 
nonbank SIFI designation, FSOC conclude that “the expected benefits to 
financial stability from Federal Reserve supervision and prudential standards 
justify the costs that the [designation] would impose.”150 Such a quantitative 
cost-benefit analysis, however, would increase the legal risk of future SIFI 
designations because it is nearly impossible to calculate the costs and 
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benefits of designation with anything approximating precision. 
Like its first recommendation, the Trump Administration’s cost-benefit 
proposal finds its origins in the MetLife decision. MetLife challenged its 
designation on the alternative ground that FSOC failed to consider the costs 
of designating the firm.151 After enumerating the ten specific factors that 
FSOC must consider when evaluating a nonbank financial company, Dodd-
Frank adds to the list “any other risk-related factors that the Council deems 
appropriate.”152 Even though this last catchall provision is couched in 
permissive language, the MetLife court held that it required FSOC to 
consider the costs MetLife would incur from designation.153 
Although most commentators agree that the MetLife court’s cost-
benefit analysis is suspect as a matter of statutory interpretation,154 the 
Trump Administration would nonetheless require FSOC to perform 
quantitative cost-benefit analyses as a matter of policy. This standard, if 
codified in FSOC’s Interpretive Guidance, “risks imposing an impossible 
burden on the council . . . .”155 
Similar to assessing a firm’s likelihood of systemic distress, quantifying 
the costs and benefits of nonbank SIFI designations poses serious analytical 
challenges. The stability-enhancing benefits of financial regulations are 
particularly difficult to calculate accurately. Quantifying the benefit of a 
crisis averted is nearly impossible.156 Because of the infrequency of financial 
crises, moreover, financial regulatory cost-benefit analyses are highly 
sensitive to crude economic loss and discount rate assumptions.157 
Unpredictable financial market dynamics, including future regulation and 
adaptation by financial firms, further complicate any attempt to quantify the 
effects of financial regulation.158 
For these reasons, quantitative cost-benefit analysis is susceptible to ex 
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post second-guessing by a reviewing court.159 Indeed, courts have 
increasingly overturned agencies’ rules “on the ground that [the] court would 
conduct its guesstimated [cost-benefit analysis] differently than [the] agency 
would.”160 As a result, the uncertainty and discretion inherent in quantitative 
cost-benefit analyses create litigation risk for financial regulators. A 
nonbank SIFI might be especially motivated to challenge its designation 
because Federal Reserve regulation would put it at a perceived competitive 
disadvantage to competitors who operate free from those rules. 
To conclude, requiring FSOC to perform quantitative cost-benefit 
analyses, as the Trump Administration proposes, would hold the Council to 
an impossible standard and render future SIFI designations vulnerable to 
legal challenge. It would thus further eviscerate entity-based nonbank 
regulation. 
III.  WHY AN ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACH MUST BE 
SUPPLEMENTED WITH AN ENTITY-BASED APPROACH 
These evolving barriers to FSOC’s designation authority are deeply 
misguided. Even assuming the implementation of an effective activities-
based regime, an entity-based approach is necessary to prevent nonbank 
firms from propagating systemic risk. This Part explains why. Section III.A 
contends that even a well-executed activities-based approach, standing 
alone, cannot reliably prevent individual firms from becoming systemically 
important. Section III.B then argues that FSOC’s entity-based designation 
authority is reasonably well tailored to promote this objective, while 
criticisms of this authority are overblown. This Part focuses on nonbank SIFI 
designations in the United States, but its arguments are largely applicable to 
parallel entity-based regimes at the international level, such as the FSB’s 
designation regime for G-SIIs. 
A.  AN ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACH IS POORLY SUITED TO PREVENT 
SYSTEMIC INSOLVENCIES 
Proposals to replace FSOC’s entity-based approach with an activities-
based approach assume that appropriately regulating systemically risky 
activities will prevent nonbanks from experiencing a systemic insolvency.161 
Although intuitively attractive, this assumption is wrong. While activities-
based regulation may mitigate some sources of systemic risk,162 even well-
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designed activities-based rules cannot prevent nonbanks from experiencing 
systemic insolvencies. At bottom, this is because the risk that a firm will 
experience a systemic failure is inherently a product of the interrelations 
among its various activities. Individual activities may pose limited systemic 
risk in isolation, but much greater systemic risk when combined at an 
individual firm. An activities-based approach is inherently blind to these 
realities. 
This point is well understood with respect to individual firms. Indeed, 
modern risk management emphasizes the importance of understanding and 
managing a firm’s risks holistically, across the entire enterprise.163 Failure 
to take such an “enterprise-wide” approach to managing risk can result in 
problems that cross-cut a firm’s operations remaining undiagnosed or 
ignored.164 But the centrality of the relationships among a firm’s individual 
activities is equally applicable to the effective management of systemic risk. 
To appreciate this point, consider the two main transmission mechanisms by 
which the failure of nonbank financial institutions can trigger broader 
financial instability: the counterparty channel and the asset liquidation 
channel.165 
1.  The Counterparty Channel 
As discussed in Part I, a firm’s susceptibility to a run is central to the 
prospect that it could trigger systemic risk through the counterparty channel. 
Moreover, only certain activities could plausibly expose a nonbank to the 
risk of a run, which requires some form of short-term liabilities.166 Long-
term debt funding or the issuance of term life insurance products do not 
create any run risk, while securities lending and the issuance of deposit-like 
contracts almost certainly do.167 Thus, many calls for an activities-based 
approach to nonbank systemic risk target activities that are thought to create 
run risk.168 
Yet an activities-based approach cannot prevent the excessive 
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accumulation of run risk at an individual nonbank financial firm for three 
reasons. First, numerous types of activities are known to create run risk, and 
many other activities may create run risk in ways that are not yet fully 
understood. Second, even if regulators could accurately identify conduct that 
creates run risk, a pure activities-based approach would still fail to prevent 
the excessive accumulation of such risk, which inherently depends on the 
interrelationships among a firm’s activities. Finally, an activities-based 
approach is also incapable of addressing other key factors relevant to 
counterparty risk, such as the size and character of a firm’s connections to 
other large financial firms. 
i.  Numerous Known and Unknown Activities Can Create Run Risk 
The financial crisis vividly demonstrated that any type of short-term 
borrowing can cause a run at a nonbank financial firm.169 Just as panicked 
depositors can withdraw funds from their bank account en masse, panicked 
counterparties in these transactions can collectively refuse to roll over their 
loans to the vulnerable nonbank. This dynamic repeated itself in numerous 
different settings during the 2008 financial crisis, including commercial 
paper, repo transactions, warehouse lines of credit, and securities lending 
agreements.170 
In fact, there are nearly infinite ways to structure short-term borrowing 
arrangements. For example, the sale or lease of any economic interest can be 
transformed into collateralized borrowing through contractual 
engineering.171 Securities lending and repo transactions exploited this fact in 
different ways, but they are merely specific examples of the broader 
principle.172 It is therefore nearly impossible to define in advance all of the 
different forms that short-term borrowing might take, at least with the 
specificity that activities-based regulation requires.173 
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Not only are there innumerable potential types of short-term borrowing, 
but short-term borrowing is not the only type of liability that can generate a 
run. For instance, the crisis illustrated that run risk can also arise from any 
transaction that potentially requires a firm to post increasing amounts of cash 
collateral. AIG’s credit default swaps (“CDSs”) are the poster child for this 
type of cash-collateral-driven run.174 These derivatives allowed 
counterparties to insist on increasing amounts of cash collateral to back the 
firm’s insurance-like promises as either the firm’s credit rating declined or 
the mortgage-backed securities they referenced decreased in value.175 
Starting in September 2007, Goldman Sachs and other counterparties 
hounded AIG to post increasing cash collateral, ultimately forcing it to raise 
$75 billion. Together with the run on AIG’s securities lending operations, 
this pressure necessitated the largest bailout of a private firm in U.S. 
history.176 
The redeemable equity issued by MMMFs is yet another type of 
liability that generated runs in the crisis but that was not short-term 
borrowing. Open-end mutual funds generally do not borrow, but instead fund 
themselves entirely with equity.177 Unlike any other types of equity, 
however, investors can redeem their shares in those funds directly on 
demand, at the fund’s net asset value (“NAV”).178 This fact created run risk 
at MMMFs because unique accounting rules artificially allowed them to 
maintain a NAV of one dollar even when the market value of their assets fell 
below this level.179 As a result, investors ran from these funds by seeking to 
withdraw their funds en masse once one large MMMF “broke the buck,” 
disclosing that the value of its assets had fallen below the one dollar 
threshold.180 
So far, this litany of activities that create run risk consists of examples 
that precipitated runs during the crisis. But innumerable potential activities 
that were not yet in widespread use during the crisis could also create run 
risk. For instance, many life insurers sell products that provide policyholders 
with an immediate right to withdraw their investment or borrow against their 
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policy value.181 Other examples include guaranteed investment contracts, 
funding agreements, and certain variable annuity contracts.182 As insurers’ 
product designs change in the future, still other innovations could trigger a 
run.183 
The prospect of new and unanticipated sources of run risk is particularly 
troubling because financial regulators are almost certain to fail to identify 
them ahead of time. Financial activities constantly evolve to evade 
regulatory restrictions when doing so can produce significant financial 
returns or lower costs, as in the case of cheap short-term funding.184 The 
predictable result is that regulators will consistently be one step behind the 
financial sector in identifying new and emerging sources of run risk.185 
ii. An Activities-Based Approach Cannot Effectively Prevent the 
Accumulation of Run Risk 
Even if regulators could reliably identify all individual activities that 
create run risks, an activities-based approach would still fall short of 
preventing runs at nonbank financial firms. This is because an individual 
firm’s exposure to a run ultimately depends on its aggregate reliance on all 
activities that create run risk. 
The inherently cumulative nature of run risk follows from the fact that 
all of a firm’s potential sources of run risk are likely to be triggered when it 
faces acute financial distress. This point is nicely illustrated by the collapse 
of AIG. As AIG’s precarious financial position became clear throughout 
2008, its CDS counterparties insisted that it post cash collateral on its 
derivatives at the same time that its securities lending counterparties 
terminated these transactions.186 It was hardly fortuitous that this run on AIG 
implicated two different activities operated out of different subsidiaries; as 
AIG’s counterparties realized the extent of the firm’s troubles, they ran 
however they could to avoid experiencing losses if AIG defaulted. 
An activities-based approach fails to address the risk that a combination 
of activities—none of which creates excessive short-term liabilities 
individually—might generate excessive run risk in the aggregate. Activities-
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based regulation generally seeks to limit the risks of an activity that creates 
short-term liabilities by, for instance, requiring that firms engaging in the 
activity maintain specified levels of liquid assets or creating mechanisms by 
which counterparties’ capacity to run is suspended.187 In doing so, activities-
based regulation sets these safeguards only by reference to the prospect that 
the underlying activity, considered in isolation, might generate a run. In the 
absence of a complementary entity-based regime, however, activities-based 
regulation cannot calibrate customized safeguards for an individual firm’s 
cumulative activities, in the aggregate. 
The inability of an activities-based approach to appropriately limit 
cumulative run risk is exacerbated by the fact that this risk is a byproduct of 
interactions between firms’ liabilities and assets.188 A seemingly reasonable 
amount of short-term debt might create dangerous run risk for a firm that 
overinvests in highly illiquid assets. For this reason, even a single activity 
that creates potential short-term liabilities may have a very different valance 
when it is combined with other activities that are not ordinarily considered 
systemic in isolation. An activities-based approach is limited in its capacity 
to respond to such interactions between the asset and liability sides of firms’ 
balance sheets. 
iii. An Activities-Based Approach Cannot Police Against Potentially 
Systemic Interconnections Between Firms 
The prospect that a nonbank firm will transmit systemic risk through 
the counterparty channel is linked to other factors in addition to its 
susceptibility to a run, including the identity of the firm’s major 
counterparties and the size of those counterparties’ exposures to the firm.189 
An activities-based approach, however, is unable to police these indicators 
of an individual firm’s interconnectedness with the broader financial system. 
This is for several reasons. First, a firm’s interconnectedness turns on the 
cumulative impact of its numerous activities. Innumerable financial 
activities—ranging from ordinary borrowing, to securities management, to 
derivatives, to the issuance of insurance policies—expose a nonbank firm’s 
counterparties to the risk that the firm might fail.190 Second, the one-size-
fits-all nature of an activities-based approach means that it is not sensitive to 
the prospect that a specific activity may pose heightened systemic risk at a 
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particular firm in light of its other activities and counterparty exposures. For 
instance, writing a CDS on a reference entity poses much greater risks if the 
firm also owns a large amount of the reference entity’s bonds. Third, U.S. 
activities-based regulation is often fragmented and unable to grasp the full 
magnitude of a company’s counterparty exposure.191 It is presumably for 
these reasons that the IAIS’s first report on designing an activities-based 
approach for systemic risk in insurance provides that “with regards to 
counterparty exposure . . . the IAIS tentatively concluded that [it is] mainly 
[an] entity-specific concept[] . . . .”192 
Ultimately, preventing the potentially systemic buildup of counterparty 
risk at individual nonbanks is impossible without considering the sum of all 
a firm’s activities and its potential threat to counterparties. This is true even 
though only certain types of activities can generate runs, as such activities 
are numerous, are difficult to identify ex ante, and pose cumulative risks to 
nonbank firms. 
2.  The Asset Liquidation Channel 
As suggested in Part I, the transmission of systemic risk through the 
asset liquidation channel often involves correlated trading behavior among 
multiple firms with similar asset holdings.193 But an individual firm, rather 
than a cluster of many firms, could play a dominant role in transmitting 
systemic risk through the asset liquidation channel if it owned a large 
percentage of a certain asset class relative to the overall market. An 
individual firm could only accomplish this if it maintained a large percentage 
of a certain asset class relative to the overall market, and the other major 
holders of that asset class were also major financial institutions. Under these 
conditions, the firm’s sudden efforts to dump its portfolio during a crisis 
could topple those other institutions by wiping out their capital.194 
An activities-based approach cannot prevent this possibility, for two 
reasons. First, as noted above, activities-based regulation targets a specific 
activity, such as a type of short-term liability, in isolation.195 In many cases, 
however, firms fail to design their liability structures to take into account the 
risks from their investment strategies. Even when an explicit link between a 
firm’s assets and liabilities does exist—as in insurance, where firms 
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generally seek to match asset and liability durations196—a firm may manage 
to accumulate a large enough position to affect prices in a particular asset 
class.197 Second, a firm is more likely to sell illiquid assets during a crisis if 
it is forced to do so as a result of a run. As discussed above, an activities-
based approach cannot prevent the accumulation of excessive run risk at a 
nonbank financial firm.198 
B.  AN ENTITY-BASED APPROACH IS WELL STRUCTURED TO LIMIT THE 
COSTS OF SYSTEMIC INSOLVENCIES 
In contrast to an activities-based approach, FSOC’s entity-based 
designation regime is reasonably well designed to limit the risk that firms 
will experience systemic insolvencies through either the counterparty or 
asset liquidation channels. Moreover, while identifying systemically 
significant nonbank firms is challenging, this task is much more manageable 
than correctly identifying all systemically significant activities ex ante. In 
addition, an entity-based approach mitigates financial stability risks if a 
systemic nonbank were to fail, supplements traditional regulatory regimes 
that lack a macroprudential orientation, and can improve the effectiveness of 
activities-based regulation. Meanwhile, many of the criticisms levied against 
FSOC’s designation authority both are overblown and have been addressed. 
1.  Designation Limits the Risk that Firms Will Experience a Systemic 
Failure 
In contrast to an activities-based approach, an entity-based regime is 
inherently focused on the cumulative impact of a firm’s activities across the 
entire financial conglomerate, as well as interactions between its assets and 
liabilities. Each of the core tools of entity-based nonbank SIFI regulation is 
oriented toward these objectives. For instance, consolidated risk-based 
capital requirements and leverage limits ensure that SIFIs maintain a 
sufficient capital cushion to absorb potential losses.199 Liquidity rules require 
a SIFI to hold a minimum amount of liquid assets to protect against runs and 
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reduce the likelihood that it will have to sell illiquid assets in a fire sale.200 
Stress tests simulate adverse economic conditions to ensure that SIFIs could 
withstand a severe downturn.201 And corporate governance reforms focus on 
improving enterprise risk management across SIFIs’ operations.202 
Supervision of nonbank SIFIs by the Federal Reserve, which is charged 
with carrying out the entity-based approach to financial stability, is also 
inherently focused on the prospect that a firm’s cumulative risk profile could 
result in a systemic insolvency.203 The Federal Reserve’s supervisory 
authority gives it the discretion to tailor the heightened prudential 
requirements described above to the circumstances of each individual firm’s 
systemic risk profile.204 Additionally, the Federal Reserve’s uniquely 
prominent role in financial regulation means that it often has the capability 
to observe both sides of a nonbank SIFI’s counterparty transactions.205 
Entity-based nonbank SIFI regulation can also prevent systemic 
insolvencies indirectly, by causing designated firms to shed risk in an effort 
to jettison their SIFI designations. The various extra regulatory restrictions 
and costs that designated firms experience are significant.206 For this reason, 
nonbanks that are designated as SIFIs have strong incentives to cease 
activities that may create the prospect of a systemic failure.207 This reality 
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has been vividly demonstrated with respect to firms that have been 
designated as SIFIs by FSOC: GE Capital and AIG both restructured their 
businesses in successful bids to shed their status as nonbank SIFIs.208 Even 
MetLife, which embraced a successful legal and political strategy to escape 
its status as a nonbank SIFI, simultaneously reduced its participation in 
certain potentially systemic activities.209 
2.  Regulators Can More Easily Target Systemic Entities than Systemic 
Activities 
An entity-based approach is inherently more effective than an activities-
based approach at preventing systemic insolvencies for a second set of 
reasons: an entity-based regime is much easier to target effectively.210 As 
discussed above, it is extremely difficult for regulators to anticipate new and 
emerging systemic activities.211 Relative to these difficulties, FSOC and 
other financial regulators are much more likely to be able to consistently and 
accurately identify nonbank SIFIs. Although the distinction between firms 
that are systemically significant and those that are not is notoriously blurry, 
it is generally straightforward to identify which firms are plausibly close to 
the line and which are clearly on one side or the other.212 Moreover, both 
U.S. and international actors have developed detailed frameworks for 
identifying systemically significant firms, which have produced similar 
results as alternative methodologies.213 
Additionally, an entity-based approach need not perfectly distinguish 
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between nonbanks that are systemically significant and those which are not 
to deter nonbanks from seeking out systemic risk.214 To the contrary, so long 
as the designation process is even roughly accurate, nonbank firms will have 
strong incentives to avoid pursuing strategies that could result in their failure 
propagating systemic risk. This is because the mere prospect of being 
designated as a SIFI—and thus facing increased regulatory restrictions and 
compliance burdens—creates real risks and uncertainties for firms, which 
they will seek to avoid. 
By contrast, an activities-based approach in isolation affirmatively 
incentivizes nonbanks to engage in regulatory arbitrage by seeking out 
activities that have not been identified or appropriately regulated. Doing so 
offers all the ordinary potential benefits to firms of systemic risk—the ability 
to reap the upside reward of risk, while externalizing some of the 
downside—but only limited downside. This is because the firm does not bear 
the full costs of engaging in such an activity until it is regulated 
appropriately. Financial firms are accustomed to adjusting as the regulatory 
landscape changes, and they can choose either to cease engaging in a newly 
identified systemic activity or to conform to the new regulatory standards. 
And unlike in an entity-based regime, either choice can be implemented 
immediately because they do not usually require affirmative approval by 
regulators. 
3.  An Entity-Based Approach Limits Harm When a Systemic Nonbank 
Fails 
Entity-based regulation not only reduces the likelihood that a 
systemically important nonbank will fail, it also limits the macroeconomic 
consequences if such a firm were to experience distress. The Dodd-Frank 
Act established the OLA to resolve financial firms that prove systemically 
important while limiting the harm to the broader economy.215 The OLA is 
unlikely to succeed, however, without ex ante entity-based nonbank 
regulation. 
The OLA expands the FDIC’s traditional commercial bank resolution 
powers by authorizing it to resolve any financial company whose disorderly 
collapse would impair U.S. financial stability.216 It thus aims to prevent a 
recurrence of the destabilizing uncertainty that took place in the aftermath of 
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Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing, when many of Lehman’s subsidiaries 
ceased operations.217 In an OLA proceeding, the FDIC would transfer a 
distressed financial conglomerate’s operating subsidiaries to a new bridge 
company.218 The FDIC would capitalize the new bridge company by wiping 
out the firm’s original shareholders and replacing unsecured creditors’ 
claims on the original holding company with the bridge company’s equity 
securities.219 In theory, this process would allow the company’s subsidiaries 
to continue their critical operations, while forcing the firm’s original 
stockholders and debt holders to absorb losses.220 
Policymakers may place any failing nonbank into an OLA proceeding 
if its collapse would adversely affect financial stability, even if FSOC had 
not previously designated the firm as a SIFI.221 Ex ante SIFI designation, 
however, is critical to a successful orderly liquidation for three reasons. 
First, ex ante entity-based regulation requires the firm, and enables 
regulators, to prepare in advance for the firm’s OLA resolution, should one 
be necessary. Dodd-Frank directs designated nonbank SIFIs to develop an 
annual resolution plan, or “living will,” explaining how the firm could be 
wound down.222 A nonbank SIFI’s living will provides regulators crucial 
insight into the firm’s legal entity structure, its key operations, and 
management information systems that allows the FDIC to plan, in advance, 
if it must resolve the firm through OLA.223 Moreover, if the FDIC or Federal 
Reserve concludes that the nonbank SIFI is too complex to be resolved in an 
orderly fashion, the agencies may object to its living will and compel the 
firm to simplify its organizational structure.224 Thus, ex ante entity-based 
regulation enhances the likelihood that a systemically important nonbank can 
be resolved with minimal systemic externalities.225 
Second, ex ante entity-based regulation can help ensure that a nonbank 
SIFI holds sufficient financial resources to facilitate its orderly resolution. 
Recall that in an OLA proceeding, the FDIC would convert the original 
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holding company’s long-term creditors into equity holders in the new bridge 
company.226 This recapitalization allows the holding company’s 
subsidiaries—for instance, its commercial bank, broker-dealer, or insurance 
companies—to continue operating.227 If, however, the holding company 
does not have sufficient long-term debt to recapitalize the bridge company, 
then the firm’s subsidiaries will be shut down and resolved under applicable 
insolvency laws—the precise outcome that the OLA seeks to avoid.228 Under 
Dodd-Frank, the Federal Reserve may require a designated nonbank SIFI to 
issue minimum amounts of long-term debt to enhance its resolvability.229 
Without ex ante entity-based regulation, however, a systemically important 
nonbank is unlikely to hold the financial resources necessary for an orderly 
resolution.230 
Third, ex ante entity-based oversight gives the Federal Reserve advance 
warning of an impending failure through the supervision process and fuller 
information about counterparties’ exposure to the firm. This would help 
prevent a repeat of the situation with Bear Stearns and AIG in 2008, in which 
the Federal Reserve had to fly blind when both companies approached it for 
emergency bailouts because it was neither company’s supervisor.231 In 
today’s framework, ex ante supervision would help policymakers assess 
whether such a firm should be placed into OLA.232 
In sum, ex ante entity-based regulation is critical if the post-crisis 
framework for resolving systemically important firms is to function as 
intended. Unless FSOC designates systemically important firms as nonbank 
SIFIs, the OLA is not likely to prevent the distress of such firms from 
destabilizing the broader economy.233 
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4.  An Entity-Based Approach Supplements Traditional Regulatory 
Regimes That Do Not Address or Sufficiently Prevent Systemic Risk 
Entity-based designation is necessary because most nonbank sectoral 
regulatory regimes have not implemented reliable macroprudential 
regulatory tools of the type that the Federal Reserve deploys for designated 
firms. Insurance regulation is the most straightforward example. In the 
United States, insurance regulation has long been the responsibility of the 
states, with little federal involvement.234 But the state-based system of 
insurance regulation suffers from serious flaws with respect to systemic risk 
regulation, which became apparent during the crisis. Most critically, the U.S. 
system of insurance regulation lacks well-developed, consolidated 
regulation and supervision of insurance holding companies.235 And state 
regulators have limited experience with or expertise in monitoring risks 
arising from an insurance conglomerate’s noninsurance subsidiaries or from 
the interactions of the conglomerate’s component parts.236 Meanwhile, in 
most states, the insurance commissioner is subject to a narrow regulatory 
mandate to protect an insurance subsidiary’s policyholders, not to limit 
financial stability risks.237 
Implementing an entity-based designation regime in settings like 
insurance, where a nonbank firm’s baseline sectoral regime is not oriented 
to systemic risk concerns, is relatively straightforward. This is because 
FSOC’s designation regime layers enhanced macroprudential regulation on 
top of an entity’s baseline regulatory regime. Although this creates some 
coordination challenges between the Federal Reserve and a firm’s baseline 
regulator, these challenges are generally manageable and have improved 
gradually as the Federal Reserve has developed working relationships with 
designated firms’ sectoral regulators, particularly state insurance 
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regulators.238 
5.  Entity-Based Regulation Can Improve the Effectiveness of Activities-
Based Regulation 
As suggested above, regulators implementing an activities-based 
approach face an immense challenge in identifying new and emerging types 
of systemically risky activities, particularly given that firms are constantly 
innovating to avoid regulatory burdens.239 An entity-based approach to 
financial stability can mitigate these shortcomings of activities-based 
regulation both by helping regulators to identify potentially systemic 
activities ex ante, and by allowing them to assess how well activities-based 
reforms are curbing risk. 
An entity-based approach produces these benefits through regular on- 
and off-site supervision of nonbank SIFIs. Continuous monitoring—a 
hallmark of entity-based systemic risk oversight—allows FSOC members 
and Federal Reserve officials to observe the impact of different activities 
across time.240 This unique vantage point allows supervisors to more quickly 
identify troubling activities. For instance, if supervisors observe that several 
nonbank SIFIs are suddenly engaging in a new activity at accelerating rates, 
this is likely to trigger enhanced scrutiny of the activity itself, in a way that 
might otherwise be overlooked.241 Likewise, firm-wide examinations and 
continuous off-site monitoring can help supervisors detect when nonbank 
SIFIs respond to activities-based rules by changing their business models to 
continue taking systemic risks. In this way, regular entity-based nonbank 
SIFI supervision can help overcome some of the limitations inherent in an 
activities-based approach. 
6.  Criticisms of FSOC’s Designation Regime Are Overblown and Have 
Been Addressed 
Critics of FSOC’s entity-based designation regime have complained 
that it creates an uneven playing field, is opaque, and imposes bank-centric 
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rules on nonbanks.242 Each of these criticisms, however, has limited 
persuasive force. 
First, the fact that FSOC’s entity-based approach creates an uneven 
playing field for designated firms is a feature, not a bug. It helps to ensure 
that nonbank firms have incentives to avoid being designated in the first 
place, and to shed their status quickly if they are so designated.243 Moreover, 
the costs of SIFI designation are less unfair than critics suggest, as they help 
offset the funding advantages that come along with being perceived as 
systemically important.244 Finally, designated firms can avoid these costs by 
taking steps to limit their systemic importance, a fact that is well illustrated 
by the de-designation of nonbank SIFIs, even under the Obama 
Administration.245 
Second, allegations of FSOC’s opacity are overblown, and in any event, 
FSOC has increased its transparency in recent years. As with all broad legal 
standards, the FSOC designation scheme necessarily sacrifices predictability 
in favor of flexibility and adaptability.246 But within these constraints, FSOC 
has taken numerous steps to enhance the transparency of its process. For 
instance, it developed a formulaic quantitative test to select only a small 
subset of all nonbank financial firms for potential designation.247 In response 
to continued industry concerns, it began informing firms earlier when they 
were being considered for designation, and it formalized its process for 
annually reevaluating such designations.248 FSOC also began to release more 
detailed explanations for its designation decisions that provide much clearer 
indications of how firms can achieve de-designation. In sum, while FSOC 
can surely further improve the transparency of its designation process, 
critics’ concerns in this domain are no longer persuasive. 
Finally, critics’ claims that designation results in the imposition of 
bank-centric rules on nonbanks are inaccurate. In response to these concerns, 
Congress passed the Insurance Capital Standards Clarification Act of 2014, 
which specifically authorized the Federal Reserve to tailor its capital 
standards for insurers to the distinctive risks posed by such firms.249 Over 
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the course of the last decade, the Federal Reserve has also developed a 
specialized team of insurance-focused experts to supervise nonbank SIFIs. 
The head of this group has repeatedly emphasized in Congressional 
testimony that the agency goes to great lengths to recognize the distinct 
regulatory issues associated with nonbank financial firms like insurers, and 
to tailor its approach accordingly.250 And, in fact, the Federal Reserve’s 
proposed insurance SIFI capital standards reflect thoughtful consideration of 
the differences between bank and insurance company business models.251 
Once again, therefore, whatever the merit of critics’ concerns about the bank-
centric nature of the Federal Reserve at the time of Dodd-Frank’s passage, 
these arguments hold little force in the continued debate over the 
appropriateness of an entity-based approach. 
*** 
In sum, entity-based systemic risk regulation is uniquely capable of 
preventing catastrophic nonbank failures. Nonbank SIFI oversight takes into 
account the cumulative effect of all of a firm’s activities, is relatively easy to 
target, and is necessary to limit the fallout if a systemic firm were to become 
insolvent. An activities-based approach, by contrast, is severely limited 
along these dimensions, as it focuses on a firm’s activities in isolation and is 
difficult to target effectively due to constant efforts by firms to avoid 
regulatory restrictions. Entity-based nonbank SIFI designations are therefore 
critical to prevent a recurrence of the systemic nonbank insolvencies from 
2008. 
IV.  AN EFFECTIVE ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACH IS 
IMPOSSIBLE IN THE CURRENT U.S. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The Trump Administration’s proposal to deemphasize FSOC’s entity-
based authority in favor of an activities-based approach is misguided for 
another reason. Although it can theoretically combat some types of systemic 
risk,252 activities-based regulation is immensely difficult to implement 
domestically as a practical matter. This is a direct result of the United States’ 
deeply fragmented legal and regulatory framework. Consequently, effective 
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activities-based systemic risk regulation might be plausible in foreign 
jurisdictions with a more centralized financial regulatory scheme. But it is 
not in the United States. 
Activities-based systemic risk regulation faces two significant obstacles 
in the United States. First, FSOC lacks legal authority to order activities-
based regulation on its own. Second, jurisdictional gaps and fragmentation 
among the primary financial regulators will impede efforts to curb systemic 
risk through activities-based regulation. 
A.  FSOC CANNOT IMPLEMENT ACTIVITIES-BASED REGULATION 
DIRECTLY 
FSOC faces a threshold challenge in implementing an activities-based 
approach: the Council has no legal authority to promulgate activities-based 
rules. Instead, FSOC’s activities-based authority is solely precatory. As 
discussed above, FSOC may recommend that the primary financial 
regulators adopt specific activities-based standards under section 120 of 
Dodd-Frank.253 But nothing requires an agency to follow this 
recommendation. Rather, the agency is free to decline FSOC’s suggestion 
after “explain[ing] in writing” why the agency determined not to follow it.254 
An agency might resist implementing activities-based regulations at 
FSOC’s urging for several reasons. For one, an agency might be captured by 
the financial sector it is supposed to regulate.255 When the SEC initially 
resisted FSOC’s recommendation for stronger regulation of MMMFs, for 
example, some commentators attributed the SEC’s intransigence to the 
MMMF industry’s influence over SEC policymaking.256 Second, an agency 
might decline a recommendation by the Council to protect its regulatory turf. 
Financial regulators are notorious for guarding their jurisdiction, and an 
agency might therefore resist perceived encroachment by the Council.257 
Third, an agency might not be inclined to spend its resources and political 
capital on drafting, implementing, and enforcing a rule that a different entity 
believes is necessary.258 
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Because its activities-based authority is solely precatory, FSOC’s only 
recourse when an agency declines to follow its recommendation is to 
designate—or threaten to designate—nonbanks within the agency’s 
jurisdiction.259 The threat of such a designation might convince an agency to 
adopt the Council’s proposed activities-based regulations because “[f]ew 
agencies relish the prospect of losing control over firms . . . that they 
traditionally regulate . . . .”260 However, if the entity-based approach 
continues to erode—whether as a result of FSOC finalizing its proposed 
procedural barriers to nonbank SIFI designations, or otherwise—such threats 
will lack credibility, leading to agencies resisting the Council’s activities-
based recommendations with impunity.261 
B.  FRAGMENTED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATION PRECLUDES AN EFFECTIVE 
ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACH 
Even if FSOC could order federal regulators to adopt activities-based 
rules, existing jurisdictional barriers would prevent an activities-based 
approach from effectively curbing nonbank systemic risk. As currently 
configured, the U.S. regulatory structure is simply incapable of overseeing 
systemically important financial activities on a system-wide basis. 
Jurisdictional fragmentation is pervasive in U.S. financial regulation, 
with both gaps and overlaps in the regulatory framework.262 In some cases, 
no federal regulator has the requisite authority to impose activities-based 
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regulations on relevant nonbank actors, leading to potentially systemic 
activities going unpoliced. In other cases, multiple federal regulators share 
jurisdiction, which can produce inconsistent enforcement and 
implementation patterns as well as critical information gaps.263 Taken 
together, these structural deficiencies seriously undermine the practical 
capacity of an activities-based approach to effectively protect financial 
stability. 
This Section details these critical structural deficiencies in the United 
States’ capacity to regulate potentially systemic financial activities. To do 
so, it focuses on eight areas where FSOC has identified activities that could 
potentially threaten U.S. financial stability. Each of these sets of activities 
has one thing in common: there is no single federal regulator that can oversee 
them for systemic risk across the entire financial sector. 
1.  Gaps in the U.S. Regulatory Framework Undermine Regulation of 
Systemic Activities 
Important segments of the financial sector lack effective systemic risk 
regulatory oversight because of gaps in the U.S. regulatory framework. 
These gaps persist for several reasons. Some are attributable to divisions of 
authority between federal and state regulators. Others developed when 
industry participants fought for, and won, exemptions from regulatory 
oversight. Still, other gaps emerged as new industries evolved that legacy 
regulatory structures were not equipped to oversee. Because of these gaps, 
even if FSOC were to recommend enhanced regulations for a particular 
financial activity, there is no guarantee that a primary federal financial 
regulator would be able to act on FSOC’s recommendation. This Section 
examines how gaps in insurance, hedge fund, and fintech oversight preclude 
an effective activities-based approach to nonbank systemic risk. 
i.  Insurance Activities 
Gaps in insurance regulation demonstrate the limits of FSOC’s 
activities-based authority. Since the financial crisis, FSOC has identified a 
wide range of insurance company activities as potentially systemically 
risky—for example, life insurance policies with cash surrender or 
redemption rights,264 guaranteed investment contracts,265 captive 
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reinsurance,266 and financial guaranty insurance.267 Yet effective activities-
based regulation of these types of transactions for systemic risk is virtually 
impossible because of jurisdictional gaps in U.S. insurance regulation. 
As discussed above, the states have traditionally regulated U.S. 
insurance companies, with minimal federal involvement.268 States’ 
dominance in insurance regulation is rooted in the reverse preemption 
provision of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provides that no federal law 
may “invalidate, impair, or supersede” state laws governing the business of 
insurance unless the federal law specifically relates to the business of 
insurance.269 
This system of state-based insurance regulation creates critical blind 
spots in the regulation of potentially systemic activities. First, not only is 
FSOC powerless to directly reform potentially systemic insurance activities 
like the cash redemption or surrender terms of life insurance policies, but so 
too are all other federal financial regulators. McCarran-Ferguson’s strictures 
against federal insurance oversight strip federal agencies of almost all 
authority to implement an FSOC recommendation regarding traditional 
insurance activities. 
Second, even if states were inclined to adopt an FSOC recommendation 
to regulate an insurance company activity more stringently, they would face 
severe coordination problems. States cannot consistently regulate potentially 
systemic activities of insurance carriers due to the independent legal 
authority of each individual state to regulate insurers conducting business in 
its jurisdiction. Although states attempt to coordinate their laws, regulation, 
and enforcement through the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (“NAIC”), these efforts are often inconsistent. States often 
refuse to implement reforms, or else implement them differently than other 
states.270 
 
 
 266. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 97–98 (2016), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/FSOC%202016%20Annual%20 
Report.pdf. 
 267. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 62 (2011), https://www. 
treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/FSOCAR2011.pdf. 
 268. See supra Section III.B.4.  
 269. Act of Mar. 9, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33, 34 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 
(2018)). For a brief history of U.S. insurance regulation, see McCoy, supra note 5, at 1393–94. 
 270. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 196, at 112. And even when state laws and 
regulations are harmonious, their enforcement by states often is not. FED. INS. OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, HOW TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 33–34 (2013), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/Documents/How%20to%20 
Modernize%20and%20Improve%20the%20System%20of%20Insurance%20Regulation%20in%20the
%20US.pdf. 
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Meanwhile, most states lack the legal authority to implement FSOC-
recommended regulations for activities conducted outside of chartered 
insurance subsidiaries. Although several states have enacted laws purporting 
to authorize their insurance commissioners to supervise insurance groups 
domiciled in their states on a consolidated basis, these statutes do not clearly 
permit commissioners to regulate noninsurance or group-wide conduct.271 
Even for those states with the legal authority to regulate activities conducted 
outside of insurance entities, some of those activities are nevertheless off 
limits due to federal preemption.272 And for activities that states could reach 
at the group level, it is hardly clear that they would enforce such regulation 
vigorously. State insurance commissions have limited experience 
scrutinizing activities conducted within an insurance conglomerate’s 
noninsurance subsidiaries, a task they did not even attempt prior to the 
financial crisis.273 Further, states lack the system-wide information on 
exposures outside of insurance that effective financial stability oversight 
demands. Due to weak and untested group-wide supervision, insurance 
conglomerates face few restrictions in conducting systemically risky 
activities within their noninsurance affiliates—precisely what went wrong 
with AIG’s CDS and securities lending operations.274 
In sum, gaps in group-wide regulation of insurance conglomerates 
would render an activities-based approach to insurance activities impotent. 
In the absence of nonbank SIFI designations, therefore, FSOC cannot 
effectively mitigate systemic risk arising from the insurance sector. 
ii.  Hedge Fund Activities 
Regulatory gaps would likewise undermine an activities-based 
approach to hedge funds. The near-failure of LTCM in 1998 and its need for 
a government-orchestrated private bailout underscored the potential risk that 
 
 
 271. See Kress, supra note 209.  
 272. For instance, in 2008, state insurance regulators lacked jurisdiction over the CDS activities of 
AIG Financial Products because the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision exerted field preemption over those 
activities. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 1, at 157–58, 162, 221–23. 
 273. The FSB concluded that the U.S. state-based system of insurance regulation lacks the capacity 
for consolidated group supervision. FIN. STABILITY BD., PEER REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES 32–38 
(2013), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130827.pdf. In recent years, states have implemented 
a variety of reforms intended to improve their group-level regulation. But these reforms rely almost 
exclusively on qualitative rather than quantitative constraints and are susceptible to coordination 
problems among state regulators. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 550. Moreover, these reforms are new, 
still developing, and largely untested. See generally The Federal Government’s Role in the Insurance 
Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Ins. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 
(2017) (testimony of Daniel Schwarcz, Professor, University of Minnesota Law School) (discussing these 
state reforms).  
 274. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 551–55. 
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hedge fund activities can pose to the larger financial system.275 In 
recognition of this continued threat, FSOC created an interagency working 
group to monitor systemic risk in the hedge fund industry.276 Because of 
statutory exemptions, however, hedge funds could avoid activities-based 
systemic risk regulation absent congressional action. 
Before the financial crisis, hedge funds largely escaped SEC regulation 
because they operated outside of the purview of federal securities laws. 
Hedge fund managers were not required to register with the SEC, nor were 
the funds themselves subject to leverage limits and other prudential rules that 
applied to other investment companies, like mutual funds.277 After the crisis, 
Dodd-Frank imposed modest regulatory requirements on hedge fund 
managers for the first time. Dodd-Frank required hedge fund managers to 
register with the SEC, undergo periodic examinations, and file confidential 
reports containing information on their funds’ leverage, counterparty 
identities and exposures, and trading strategies.278 
Dodd-Frank did not, however, impose prudential requirements on 
hedge funds, nor did it authorize the SEC to adopt such regulations. Thus, 
hedge funds remain exempt from the Investment Company Act of 1940—
the statutory authority that permits the SEC to regulate mutual funds and 
other investment companies.279 The SEC, therefore, currently lacks power to 
adopt activities-based reforms for hedge funds, such as restrictions on 
specific trading practices.280 This inability to prudentially regulate hedge 
funds would frustrate an activities-based approach to nonbank systemic risk. 
Even if FSOC wanted to recommend activities-based regulations for hedge 
funds’ activities, it would be fruitless because the SEC would not be able to 
implement such rules. 
iii.  Fintech 
Similarly, gaps in the U.S. regulatory framework would impede an 
activities-based approach to emerging risks in the fintech sector. FSOC has 
warned about financial stability threats from marketplace lending, payment 
 
 
 275. See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE 
LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 10–17 (1999), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf. 
 276. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 96, at 20–21.  
 277. Id. at 14; Marco Bodellini, From Systemic Risk to Financial Scandals: The Shortcomings of 
U.S. Hedge Fund Regulation, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 417, 456–59 (2017). 
 278. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2018). 
 279. Bodellini, supra note 277, at 456–59. 
 280. See id. 
  
1510 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1455 
systems, virtual currencies, and other fintech innovations.281 According to 
the Council, these technologies “create unanticipated risks and 
vulnerabilities.”282 Despite these risks, the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office reports that “some fintech companies may not be subject to 
any . . . financial oversight . . . .”283 Accordingly, activities-based systemic 
risk regulation of fintech would face serious challenges because, at least in 
some cases, no primary federal financial regulatory agency would have 
authority to implement FSOC’s activities-based recommendations.284 
Rapid innovations in the fintech sector have revealed problematic gaps 
in the oversight of these new technologies. Online marketplace lenders like 
LendingClub and Prosper, which provide financing to consumers and small 
businesses, are subject to a patchwork of state-based licensing requirements 
but no federal regulation for safety and soundness or systemic risk.285 
Likewise, nonbank payment services like PayPal and Venmo face 
inconsistent state oversight, and some fintech payments firms could escape 
federal and state regulation entirely.286 Meanwhile, Bitcoin, Ether, and other 
cryptocurrencies avoid comprehensive federal oversight by the CFTC and 
SEC, whose legal authority to regulate such products is debatable.287 
Because federal jurisdiction in these areas is unclear at best, activities-based 
systemic risk regulation might be unable to reach important segments of the 
fintech market. 
 
 
 281. See FSOC 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 126–27. For a discussion of fintech’s 
potential threats to financial stability, see generally Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech 
as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 YALE J. ON REG. 735, 786−89 (2019); Rory Van Loo, Making Innovation 
More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232 (2018). 
 282. FSOC 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 6. 
 283. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-254, FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY: ADDITIONAL 
STEPS BY REGULATORS COULD BETTER PROTECT CONSUMERS AND AID REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 38 
(2018) (emphasis added), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690803.pdf [hereinafter GAO FINTECH 
REPORT]. 
 284. For a discussion of gaps in fintech supervision, see Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 
117 MICH. L. REV. 815, 875 (2019). 
 285. See GAO FINTECH REPORT, supra note 283, at 34; Brian Knight, Federalism and 
Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129, 144 (2017). In July 2018, the 
OCC created a federal charter for fintech firms, but the prospects for this charter type are uncertain. See 
Rachel Witkowski, After Years of Debate, OCC to Offer Fintech Charter, AM. BANKER (July 31, 2018, 
2:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/after-years-of-debate-occ-to-offer-fintech-charter. 
 286. See GAO FINTECH REPORT, supra note 283, at 38; Knight, supra note 285, at 153–61. 
 287. See Virtual Currencies: The Oversight Role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., 
& Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 103 (2018) (statement of J. Christopher Giancarlo, Chairman, U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission); Anna Irrera, U.S. SEC Official Says Ether Not a Security, 
Price Surges, REUTERS (June 14, 2018, 1:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cryptocurrencies-
ether/u-s-sec-official-says-ether-not-a-security-price-surges-idUSKBN1JA30Q. 
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2.  Fragmentation in the U.S. Regulatory Framework Impedes Activities-
Based Regulation 
While some parts of the financial sector fall within regulatory 
interstices, other areas suffer from the opposite problem: they are subject to 
regulation by many agencies. There are a number of reasons why 
jurisdictional fragmentation pervades U.S. financial regulation. Often, 
agencies split responsibility for functionally equivalent activities because 
those activities are defined as different products. In other cases, different 
agencies regulate different types of entities that engage in the same activity. 
And in still other cases, multiple regulators oversee the same activities for 
different risks. Finally, jurisdiction for a single activity or entity may be 
spread across federal and state agencies. 
This fragmentation poses serious challenges for activities-based 
systemic risk regulation. Even if FSOC were to recommend activities-based 
regulations, jurisdictional fragmentation would undermine regulators’ 
ability to enact and enforce uniform, consistent rules in five ways. First, 
because each financial regulator focuses narrowly on its jurisdiction, no 
agency has a complete view of the risks within the larger financial system. 
Highly fragmented regulators therefore lack sufficient information to 
implement a holistic, activities-based approach. Second, while FSOC could 
attempt to coordinate among regulators, such coordination is inherently 
limited because different agencies may nonetheless issue incompatible rules 
for the same risk. Third, even if the agencies did adopt uniform rules, 
differences in how the agencies interpret and enforce regulations could 
undermine the goal of a uniform, consistent approach to systemic risk. 
Fourth, regulators may engage in a race-to-the-bottom by adopting less 
stringent regulations than other agencies, as each regulator competes to 
expand its jurisdiction. Finally, under these circumstances, financial 
institutions may seek out opportunities for regulatory arbitrage by moving 
activities to less-regulated parts of the system. 
These challenges vastly complicate activities-based regulation of 
nonbank systemic risk. By way of example, this Section examines regulatory 
fragmentation of five activities that pose potential financial stability risks: 
mortgages, securities, derivatives, short-term funding, and cybersecurity. It 
concludes that fragmentation would create serious challenges if FSOC were 
to adopt an activities-based approach in any of these areas. 
i.  Mortgages 
The central role of mortgages in both the 2008 financial crisis and the 
1980s savings and loan crisis epitomizes a larger historical trend: the worst 
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global financial crises have involved real estate bubbles fueled by lax lending 
standards.288 Given the prominence of mortgage credit in financial crises, 
one might expect to find a robust, unified framework for systemic risk 
oversight of mortgages in the United States. But that is hardly the case. To 
the contrary, federal mortgage regulation is highly fragmented.289 This 
fragmentation renders an activities-based approach to mortgage regulation 
practically unworkable. 
Considerable fragmentation stems from differences in the regulation of 
commercial and residential mortgages. Commercial mortgages are subject to 
lighter federal regulation than their residential counterparts. Banks, which 
dominate commercial mortgage lending, are supervised by the Federal 
Reserve, the FDIC, or the OCC, depending on their charters, for solvency 
risk.290 Separately, commercial mortgage-backed securitizations and REITs 
undergo SEC regulation for risk to investors.291 Commercial mortgages 
originated by independent nonbank lenders generally are not subject to 
significant federal oversight. 
Residential mortgages are subject to most of the same federal regulation 
as commercial mortgages, plus more. For example, the CFPB regulates 
residential mortgages—by depository institutions and nonbank lenders 
alike—for market conduct risk to consumers. The CFPB has virtually 
exclusive rulemaking authority in that respect, but shares responsibility for 
supervision and enforcement with the federal prudential banking regulators 
and the Federal Trade Commission.292 Although the CFPB Director sits on 
FSOC and the CFPB’s rules play an important role in constraining systemic 
risk from home mortgages, the Bureau frames its mission in terms of 
protecting consumers, not mitigating threats to financial stability.293 
Additional federal regulation of residential mortgages comes from two 
 
 
 288. See, e.g., CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT 
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY, at xliv–xlv, 158–62 (2009); see also Ryan Bubb & Prasad 
Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles: How Mortgage Regulation Can Keep Main Street and Wall 
Street Safe—From Themselves, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1539, 1549–55 (2015).  
 289. There is some systemic risk regulation of mortgages, but it is limited in reach. The mortgage 
activities of systemically important depository institutions and nonbank SIFIs are subject to financial 
stability oversight by the Federal Reserve. Meanwhile, the joint risk retention rule requires sponsors of 
certain mortgage-backed securities to retain risk. Joint Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys. et al., Six Federal Agencies Jointly Approve Final Risk Retention Rule (Oct. 22, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2014-236.html. 
 290. See, e.g., BARR ET AL., supra note 1, at 174, 174 fig. 2.1–.5. 
 291. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2019). 
 292. See BARR ET AL., supra note 1, at 584, 588–91. 
 293. See The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
about-us/the-bureau (last visited Sept. 19, 2019).  
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main financing channels: the government-sponsored entities (“GSEs”) 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal insurers and guarantors. The 
GSEs, under the auspices of their regulator and conservator, the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”), impose extensive requirements on the 
origination and servicing of the residential mortgage loans they buy.294 
Meanwhile, the Federal Housing Administration, the Department of 
Veterans Affairs, the Department of Agriculture, and the Rural Housing 
Service (plus their financing arm, Ginnie Mae), heavily regulate the home 
loans they insure or guarantee.295 In light of this fragmentation, even if FSOC 
sought to implement consistent activities-based mortgage regulation for 
systemic risk, it would be hard-pressed to succeed because that jurisdiction 
is divided among so many federal agencies. 
ii.  Securities 
U.S. securities regulation is likewise divided because Congress ceded 
jurisdiction over some securities activities of commercial banks to the 
traditional banking regulators—the FDIC, OCC, and Federal Reserve.296 
This dispersed authority over securities regulation must be taken into 
account in any appraisal of an activities-based approach to systemic risk, 
given the role of banking groups in securitization and the reorganization of 
leading investment banks as financial holding companies under the watch of 
the Federal Reserve. 
In the banking sector, jurisdiction over securities regulation is split 
between the SEC and federal banking regulators, and some federal securities 
laws do not apply to banks at all. Congress exempted banks from important 
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”),297 the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”),298 the Investment Company Act 
of 1940,299 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940300 because banks are 
 
 
 294. See Access the Single Family Guides, FANNIE MAE, https://www.fanniemae.com/ 
singlefamily/index (last visited Sept. 19, 2019); Freddie Mac’s Selling and Servicing Requirements, 
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 295. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., SINGLE FAMILY HOUSING POLICY HANDBOOK 
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 296. This discussion of securities regulation jurisdiction is heavily informed by Schooner, supra 
note 9. 
 297. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74. 
 298. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-290, 48 Stat. 881. 
 299. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 80a-1 to -64 (2018)). 
 300. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
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subject to a comprehensive scheme of federal banking regulation.301 In other 
cases, depository institutions are bound by federal securities laws, but 
Congress entrusted oversight of those provisions with respect to banks and 
sometimes thrifts to federal prudential banking regulators, not the SEC.302 
This division of federal securities jurisdiction among the SEC and three 
federal banking regulators impedes activities-based regulation of securities 
for systemic risk. It creates one system of securities regulation for 
independent nonbank securities market actors (who are regulated by the 
SEC) and another one for banking companies (whose securities activities are 
regulated by federal banking regulators and are sometimes exempt from 
federal regulation altogether). These two systems produce inconsistent rules 
and openings for regulatory arbitrage that obstruct a unified approach to 
systemic risk in securities regulation. 
iii.  Derivatives 
A similar fragmentation problem bedevils derivatives regulation. 
Throughout their histories, the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (“CFTC”) have clashed repeatedly in jurisdictional battles over 
securities and commodities markets.303 Since Dodd-Frank, the combative 
agencies now share legal authority for derivatives that previously had been 
traded over-the-counter (“OTC”), without regulation. In deference to the 
historic division of authority between the CFTC over futures and the SEC 
over securities, Congress gave jurisdiction over “swaps” to the CFTC and 
 
 
§§ 80b-1 to -2). 
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“security-based swaps” to the SEC.304 The two agencies jointly regulate 
“mixed swaps.”305 Notably, however, the SEC and CFTC are not required to 
treat functionally or economically similar swap products or entities in an 
identical manner.306 
This fragmented oversight of derivatives markets creates the risk of 
inconsistent regulations, regulatory arbitrage, and a race-to-the-bottom, as 
discussed above. While the SEC and CFTC have attempted to coordinate 
with one another,307 some observers remain concerned that jurisdictional 
fragmentation undermines systemic risk regulation in derivatives markets.308 
In short, if FSOC were to recommend enhanced activities-based derivatives 
rules, jurisdictional feuds and potentially inconsistent rules and enforcement 
by the SEC and CFTC could thwart effective systemic risk regulation. 
iv.  Short-Term Securities Financing 
Fragmented regulatory jurisdiction would likewise undercut an 
activities-based approach to short-term securities financing, such as repo 
agreements and securities lending. As discussed above, these short-term 
liabilities pose legitimate threats to financial stability, as an institution’s 
rapid loss of such funding can spread systemic risk.309 Recognizing these 
risks, FSOC has warned that short-term securities financing “must be 
carefully managed and subjected to appropriate oversight.”310 
Comprehensive, activities-based oversight of short-term securities financing 
is nearly impossible, however, because jurisdiction over repo and securities 
lending is fractured among a multiplicity of regulators. 
Fragmented jurisdiction over short-term securities financing stems from 
its near-ubiquitous use in different financial sectors. Broker-dealers, hedge 
funds, banks, pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, central 
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banks, sovereign wealth funds, and endowments commonly borrow through 
repo or securities lending.311 Many of these same institutions also participate 
on the opposite side of these transactions by providing short-term funding to 
counterparties. Indeed, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, 
MMMFs, banks, governments, GSEs, securities dealers, and hedge funds are 
major cash investors in both repo and securities lending.312 
Given the diversity of institutions that engage in short-term securities 
financing, numerous federal and state regulators assert jurisdiction over this 
conduct. For example, the SEC oversees the repo activities of registered 
investment companies and U.S. broker-dealers, often in tandem with the 
Federal Reserve, which regulates the BHC parent companies of many 
broker-dealers.313 Meanwhile, federal banking regulators oversee the repo 
activities of banks, while state insurance commissioners supervise repo 
transactions by insurance firms.314 Jurisdiction over securities lending is 
similarly fragmented along entity and sectoral lines, with the SEC, Federal 
Reserve, OCC, FDIC, U.S. Department of Labor, and state insurance 
commissions all playing prominent roles.315 
This decentralized oversight creates thorny problems for implementing 
activities-based oversight of repo and securities lending. Just monitoring 
these markets for systemic risk is difficult because the reporting 
requirements differ by sector.316 Any activities-based approach to regulating 
short-term securities financing—such as limits on the aggregate amount of 
this activity at any firm or requirements that they be paired with liquid 
assets—would inevitably result in inconsistent implementation and an 
unlevel competitive playing field that would present opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage. Indeed, this is exactly what has occurred with respect 
to entity-based approaches in this domain.317 Although an activities-based 
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approach might theoretically be able to resolve this problem, there is no way 
to implement such an approach consistently given the current fragmentation 
of regulatory authority in this domain. Meanwhile, coordination problems 
would thwart a crisis response if a securities dealer defaulted on its repo 
loans because no single regulator would have the authority to oversee an 
orderly sale of the collateral in its creditors’ hands, increasing the chances of 
a run.318 In sum, this web of competing rules, agency fiefdoms, arbitrage 
incentives, and coordination problems would make a uniform set of 
activities-based rules for systemic risk nearly impossible in the repo and 
securities lending space. 
v.  Cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity is yet another potentially systemic threat where 
jurisdictional fragmentation would undermine an activities-based approach. 
As FSOC has noted, a cyberattack or outage could disrupt market trading, 
paralyze the operations of a key financial hub, interrupt clearing and 
settlement, and shatter customers’ confidence in the financial system.319 This 
system-wide risk demands an overarching approach that focuses on the 
larger structure of financial markets and the weak links within them. U.S. 
regulation of financial market cybersecurity falls woefully short of this goal. 
In the financial arena, cyber regulation is siloed among various state 
and federal regulators. At the federal level, nine financial regulators and the 
Treasury Department have direct jurisdiction over cybersecurity at financial 
firms.320 State banking, insurance, and securities regulators have concurrent 
authority over state-chartered financial companies.321 Adding to this, the 
Department of Homeland Security has lead responsibility for the federal 
response to cyber threats, while other federal agencies and departments, 
including the Federal Communications Commission and the Department of 
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Justice, oversee other discrete aspects of cybersecurity.322 
This cybersecurity tower of Babel seriously impedes a system-wide 
approach to cyber threats against financial firms. There is no single financial 
regulator with sight lines into the IT infrastructure of the entire financial 
sector or umbrella jurisdiction to address the sectoral threat. Alarmingly, 
cooperation among federal regulators has mostly been limited to “sharing 
information about cybersecurity threats.”323 The Office of Financial 
Research has warned that current “[r]egulatory boundaries may limit 
regulators’ perspectives on key parts of financial networks” and that 
“[p]otential blind spots include third-party vendors, overseas counterparties, 
and cross-border service providers.”324 To exacerbate matters, the welter of 
regulators has resulted in a proliferation of cybersecurity rules, guidelines, 
and frameworks that are marred by inconsistency and complexity.325 
In light of system-wide risks, an activities-based approach to 
cybersecurity would make eminent sense. Currently, however, the jumble of 
overlapping jurisdictional lines makes a unified approach to activities-based 
regulation of cybersecurity-related systemic risk impossible. 
*** 
Jurisdictional complexities in the U.S. regulatory framework would 
thus render an activities-based approach to systemic risk unworkable. Even 
if FSOC were to recommend activities-based regulation for systemically 
important activities, the primary financial regulators would be unlikely to 
enact uniform, effective rules because of gaps and fragmentation in the 
regulatory structure. Remarkably, not one of the potentially systemic 
activities discussed in this section has an umbrella federal regulator that can 
oversee conduct across the entire financial sector. In some cases, like 
insurance activities, hedge funds, and fintech, federal regulators lack 
authority to impose systemic risk constraints. In other cases, like mortgages, 
derivatives, securities, short-term financing, and cybersecurity, federal 
regulation is divided among multiple agencies, all with different rules and 
approaches. These are just a few examples of potential weaknesses in the 
U.S. regulatory framework, and additional jurisdictional problems are 
certain to arise in the future. It is therefore unrealistic to imagine that 
regulators could implement uniform activities-based rules to curb risk for 
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systemically important financial activities, absent significant reforms to the 
U.S. regulatory framework. 
V.  AN APPROPRIATELY STRUCTURED ACTIVITIES-BASED 
APPROACH COULD COMPLEMENT ENTITY-BASED 
DESIGNATIONS 
Abandoning FSOC’s entity-based authority in favor of an activities-
based approach would be deeply misguided for reasons that we explained in 
Parts III and IV. None of this is to say, however, that activities-based 
regulation is incapable of helping to preserve financial stability. To the 
contrary, activities-based regulation could combat some sources of nonbank 
systemic risk—but only if Congress overhauls the U.S. regulatory 
framework to achieve this goal. 
In an optimal activities-based regulatory regime, a single agency with a 
financial stability mandate would enact and enforce rules across the entire 
U.S. financial sector. This Part explains how, if such a regime were 
implemented in the United States, an activities-based approach could 
meaningfully complement an entity-based approach to nonbank systemic 
risk. Section V.A describes the significant structural changes that 
policymakers would need to make to the U.S. regulatory framework to 
operationalize an effective activities-based approach. Section V.B then 
assesses the unique benefits that an activities-based approach could achieve 
under this optimal regulatory design. 
A.  AN EFFECTIVE ACTIVITIES-BASED APPROACH REQUIRES A SINGLE 
FINANCIAL STABILITY REGULATOR 
Despite its shortcomings, an activities-based approach to nonbank 
systemic risk has the potential to augment an entity-based approach, but only 
after significant structural reforms to the U.S. regulatory framework. The 
current regime—with its fragmentation, microprudential focus, and 
opportunities for arbitrage—is inimical to effective activities-based systemic 
risk regulation. To effectively mitigate systemic risk through an activities-
based approach, a financial stability regulator must have three key 
characteristics: consolidated authority, a macroprudential orientation, and 
market-wide reach. 
First, an effective activities-based regulatory regime must be carried out 
by a single federal regulator. By consolidating authority for systemic risk 
regulation in one regulator, the United States could avoid the interagency 
coordination problems, jurisdictional turf wars, races-to-the-bottom, and 
other pitfalls inherent in its current fragmented system. Congress understood 
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the need for unified jurisdiction when it consolidated nonbank SIFI 
regulation in the Federal Reserve. An activities-based approach to systemic 
risk likewise requires a single federal regulator. 
Second, this unified regulator should have macroprudential stability as 
its core objective. Financial stability oversight is principally concerned with 
the transmission of systemic risk among companies and throughout the 
financial sector. As discussed above, however, most U.S. sectoral regulators 
currently focus on microprudential goals, such as preserving individual 
firms’ solvency and protecting consumers.326 By contrast, an effective 
financial stability regulator would augment this existing regime by focusing 
on how systemically important activities could propagate financial 
instability. 
Finally, effective activities-based regulation requires the unified 
systemic risk regulator to have authority over the entire financial system. 
This means that the regulator must be able to implement and enforce 
activities-based rules across different financial institutions, including banks, 
insurance companies, investment banks, and asset managers. Market-wide 
reach ensures that activities-based rules will apply consistently across the 
financial system, thereby preventing risk from migrating to less heavily 
regulated parts of the financial system. Moreover, it would limit uncertainty 
as to whether the regulator has authority over unanticipated financial 
innovations. 
Other jurisdictions have adopted a regulatory structure similar to the 
one we envision here.327 Often referred to as a “multi-peaked” system, this 
regulatory design pairs a single financial stability regulator with one or more 
additional regulators focused on other objectives, such as market conduct 
and solvency oversight.328 The United States, however, has rejected previous 
calls for a multi-peaked system with a consolidated systemic risk 
regulator.329 
To be sure, a consolidated systemic risk regulator in the United States 
would face serious implementation challenges. Policymakers would have to 
consider, for example, how to resolve conflicts between agencies in a multi-
peaked system, ensure the systemic risk regulator has access to financial 
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sector information and data, and fund the agency. Moreover, such a dramatic 
shift in regulatory structure would likely face political opposition from 
existing regulatory agencies and entrenched financial sector interests. 
We do not set out to resolve these implementation barriers here. Rather, 
we highlight this alternative regulatory structure to emphasize a critical 
point: for an activities-based approach to systemic risk regulation to work in 
the United States, a radical restructuring of the existing regulatory 
framework would be required. The Trump Administration’s proposal to shift 
to a predominantly activities-based approach, unfortunately, does not 
acknowledge this reality. 
B.  IF CONFIGURED APPROPRIATELY, ACTIVITIES-BASED REGULATION IS 
UNIQUELY CAPABLE OF ADDRESSING SOME SYSTEMIC RISKS 
While practically and politically challenging, these structural reforms 
are nonetheless worth pursuing because a properly configured activities-
based approach could meaningfully complement FSOC’s entity-based 
designation regime. In fact, a properly designed activities-based approach 
would be superior to entity-based regulation at preventing some sources of 
financial stability risks. Specifically, activities-based regulation, when 
structured appropriately, can address systemic correlations among firms, 
mitigate risks of particular systemic activities, and help eliminate regulatory 
arbitrage. 
1.  Activities-Based Regulation Can Address Systemic Correlations Among 
Individual Firms 
Properly configured activities-based regulation is well suited to 
mitigate risks that cross-cut different segments of the financial sector and are 
not concentrated in a single firm. Large, interconnected institutions are not 
the only firms that can propagate systemic risk. Firms that are not 
systemically important individually can threaten financial stability when 
they adopt common business models, investment strategies, or other 
correlated practices.330 Activities-based regulation can target these market-
wide systemic correlations effectively and efficiently. 
Potentially systemic correlations among individual firms can arise in 
different ways. For example, commonalities in firms’ business models or 
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product offerings may destabilize the broader financial system, as occurred 
with nonbank mortgage lenders and securitizers during the financial crisis.331 
Many of these firms were relatively small and not systemically important, 
individually.332 Yet they collectively propagated systemic risk because they 
adopted nearly identical business models based on issuance of dubious debt 
instruments. 
Similarly, correlations among nonbanks’ investment holdings and 
strategies can threaten financial markets through the asset liquidation 
channel.333 For example, because many insurance companies hold similar 
portfolios of financial assets, the liquidation of an asset class by a subset of 
insurers could create downward pressure on asset prices that threatens the 
solvency of other firms.334 Simultaneous dumping of assets could occur if 
firms faced similar regulatory or rating agency pressures to divest.335 Pension 
funds and hedge funds may exhibit similar potentially systemic correlations 
with respect to both their asset holdings and their investment strategies.336 
Still other correlations could destabilize the financial system. 
Widespread risk management deficiencies can create systemic risk, as when 
firms’ pre-crisis risk models discounted the possibility of a nationwide drop 
in housing prices.337 Similarly, defective information technology might 
propagate risks, as could occur in the event of widespread cybersecurity 
breaches.338 Moreover, algorithmic high-frequency traders or automated 
investment advisors might adopt highly correlated strategies, creating the 
risk of “flash crashes” and severe market disruptions.339 In sum, many 
different types of conduct can trigger systemic risk when replicated by a 
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critical mass of smaller institutions. 
An entity-based approach is ill-equipped to address these market-wide 
risks. By definition, FSOC’s entity-based designation regime applies only to 
a limited subset of nonbanks that could individually threaten U.S. financial 
stability through their material financial distress or mix of activities.340 
Because it focuses only on these large, interconnected firms, FSOC’s entity-
based approach cannot effectively mitigate systemic risk arising from 
correlations among numerous smaller companies.341 For example, even if the 
Federal Reserve mandated enhancements in systemically important firms’ 
risk models or information technology, correlated weaknesses in smaller 
companies’ risk management or cybersecurity could still pose systemic risk. 
By contrast, properly configured activities-based regulation is uniquely 
suited to address correlated systemic risks because it can reach across 
different segments of the financial sector to all institutions, regardless of their 
perceived systemic importance. It was for this reason that Dodd-Frank 
directly mandated several activities-based changes to financial regulation. 
For example, Dodd-Frank established minimum underwriting standards and 
risk-retention requirements applicable to all residential mortgage originators 
and all securitizers, respectively, regardless of their systemic importance.342 
Such an activities-based approach was necessary because of the plethora of 
different types of firms involved in these activities. 
A consolidated systemic risk regulator could implement reforms 
targeting correlated, potentially systemic activities in much the same way 
Congress adopted such reforms legislatively in Dodd-Frank. For instance, it 
could impose regulations to mitigate weaknesses in firms’ risk management 
or cybersecurity practices by establishing market-wide standards for risk 
models and information technology. Or, it could implement an activities-
based approach to correlated high-frequency or automated trading that risks 
destabilizing financial markets. In this way, FSOC can use its activities-
based authority to mitigate the chances of numerous institutions collectively 
propagating systemic risk.  
 
 
 340. See supra Section II.A. 
 341. Schwarcz & Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 1627–39. 
 342. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o–11 (2018); Patricia A. McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and Its 
Challenges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1181, 1213–16 (2015). 
  
1524 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1455 
2.  An Activities-Based Approach Can Target Conduct That Is 
Inadequately Addressed by Entity-Based Regulation 
Because it focuses on individual firms’ health, entity-based regulation 
generally does not attempt to address market-wide risks posed by specific 
types of financial transactions. An activities-based approach, however, can 
ensure that firms conduct systemically risky activities in ways that limit 
threats to financial stability. 
Derivatives dealing and securities lending are classic examples of 
activities that can threaten financial stability. In the lead-up to the 2008 
financial crisis, just a handful of firms traded the vast majority of over-the-
counter derivatives in the United States.343 This concentration created a web 
of overlapping exposures among systemically important derivatives dealers, 
leading to the prospect that a single dealer’s failure could impose 
catastrophic losses on its counterparties.344 Similarly, AIG’s extensive 
securities lending operations contributed to its collapse when borrowers 
demanded early return of their cash collateral, forcing AIG to liquidate its 
mortgage-backed securities portfolio and raising questions about its ability 
to satisfy its obligations to counterparties.345 
Standing alone, an entity-based approach is insufficient to mitigate risks 
of these and other systemically risky activities. In practice, entity-based 
regulation focuses inward, on broad indicators of an individual firm’s health, 
such as its capital and liquidity.346 But many systemically important 
activities, such as derivatives trading and securities lending, involve complex 
relationships among firms across the financial sector.347 Regulating this type 
of conduct often requires mediating intercompany relationships and 
potentially relying on market infrastructure such as clearinghouses and 
exchanges. Traditional entity-based regulation is often not well-equipped to 
oversee these relationships or provide this infrastructure.348 
A well-designed activities-based approach, by contrast, can more 
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directly increase the safety of systemically important activities. That is 
precisely why Congress adopted activities-based derivatives regulations in 
Dodd-Frank. As a centerpiece of its derivatives reforms, Congress subjected 
certain categories of swaps to mandatory central clearing and to trading on 
exchanges.349 Exchange trading enhances transparency, while central 
clearing places a clearinghouse between the original counterparties to a 
derivative trade, thereby reducing market participants’ direct exposures to 
one another.350 In this way, Congress mitigated risks through activities-based 
derivatives regulation more effectively than would have been possible 
through an entity-based approach alone.351 
A consolidated financial stability regulator could implement activities-
based rules to limit risks associated with other systemically important 
conduct, as well. Such a regulator could, for instance, implement reforms 
specifically addressing the risks of securities lending. Moreover, an 
activities-based approach to repo markets could allow policymakers to 
oversee both the lending and borrowing sides of those transactions. In sum, 
appropriately configured activities-based regulation can help moderate the 
risks of certain systemically important activities that an entity-based 
approach is poorly equipped to address. 
3.  Activities-Based Regulation Can Help Eliminate Regulatory Arbitrage 
In addition to addressing various types of systemic risk more effectively 
than entity-based regulation, activities-based regulation can also improve the 
effectiveness of entity-based systemic risk regulation by reducing regulatory 
arbitrage. In traditional financial regulation, the applicable regulatory regime 
depends on a firm’s classification as a bank, broker-dealer, insurance 
company, or other type of legal entity.352 This entity-based approach 
incentivizes the financial sector to shift activities to less regulated legal 
entities, a fact that was well illustrated in the lead up to the financial crisis.353 
AIG, for example, issued its CDSs out of AIG Financial Products, a 
subsidiary that was not licensed as an insurance company and therefore 
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exempt from state insurance regulation.354 Similarly, in the mid-2000s, a 
significant proportion of mortgage lending shifted to federally chartered 
depository institutions and their nonbank mortgage subsidiaries because 
federal preemption allowed them to offer subprime and other exotic loans 
free from restrictions under state anti-predatory lending laws.355 
A properly designed activities-based approach would be immune to this 
type of regulatory arbitrage because it would apply consistent, market-wide 
standards to financial transactions, regardless of a firm’s legal 
classification.356 For example, post-crisis mortgage reforms subject 
residential loans to minimum underwriting standards, regardless of the 
originator’s organizational form or charter.357 Market-wide activities-based 
regulation thus produces three distinct benefits. First, it limits the rewards to 
firms of moving activities to lesser regulated entities, and thus limits this 
type of regulatory arbitrage from occurring. Second, it limits the harm that 
can result when this type of arbitrage does occur. Finally, it discourages a 
race-to-the-bottom by regulators that would further inflame regulatory 
arbitrage. 
*** 
In sum, when structured appropriately, an activities-based approach to 
nonbank systemic risk can enhance financial stability in several unique 
ways—by addressing systemic correlations, targeting systemically 
important activities, and preventing regulatory arbitrage. To achieve these 
benefits, however, the United States would need to dramatically reform its 
regulatory framework by consolidating authority for systemic risk regulation 
within a single financial stability agency. With such reforms, activities-based 
regulation could meaningfully complement an effective entity-based 
approach. In the absence of such reforms, however, proposals to rely 
primarily or exclusively on an activities-based approach to nonbank systemic 
risk are doomed to fail. 
CONCLUSION 
The 2008 financial crisis demonstrated unequivocally that, absent 
appropriate regulatory oversight, nonbank financial institutions can threaten 
the global economy. This Article has argued that to prevent a recurrence, 
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policymakers—both domestically and internationally—must use entity- and 
activities-based approaches as complements to mitigate nonbank systemic 
risk. Recent efforts to eliminate nonbank SIFI designations entirely or else 
saddle them with excessive and unrealistic procedural requirements ignore 
the unique ways in which entity-based regulation can prevent systemic 
insolvencies. Moreover, these efforts overlook the serious practical hurdles 
that activities-based regulation faces in fragmented regulatory systems such 
as the United States’. An effective approach to nonbank systemic risk would 
therefore retain entity-based designations while also empowering a unified 
systemic risk regulator to implement activities-based rules. By using entity-
based and properly configured activities-based approaches as complements, 
rather than substitutes, policymakers could prevent the next AIG, Lehman 
Brothers, or Bear Stearns from destabilizing the global financial system. 
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